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Plato
"

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THE
CRITO OF PLATO

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

ST. GEORGE STOCK, M.A.

PEMBROKE COLLEGE

PART I.—INTRODUCTION AND TEXT

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PREFACE



SINCE this University prescribes books for students, it is but reasonable that it should supply them with editions in which to read them. This, it is hoped, will be deemed a sufficient excuse for the appearance of a new edition of the Crito, in which the wants of candidates for Responsions have been specially kept in view. They have grammar behind them and philosophy before, and require to be reminded of the one and to be given a foretaste of the other. Some of them will afterwards go in for Honours; others will remain contented with a Pass. If the notes therefore should appear to any too elementary, let them remember the needs of the weaker brethren; if any, on the contrary, think them too hard, let them bear in mind that the requirements of scholars and teachers have had to be consulted as well as their own.

The previous editors to whom I am bound to make acknowledgement are, first and chiefly, Stallbaum, and after him Purves, Cron and Wagner. Had I consulted Mr. Adam's edition, I would doubtless have improved my own: but I could not bring myself to exploit a work which has so recently appeared before the public. Among

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collateral aids Wayte's notes on the Protagoras have been found the most useful. To Mr. Evelyn Abbott I am indebted, not only for his revision of my work, but also for his Index to Plato, for which every scholar has reason to be grateful.

The text followed in this edition is that of the Zurich editors.

ST. GEORGE STOCK.

8, MUSEUM ROAD, OXFORD,

Aug. 13, 1891.

INTRODUCTION

THE *Crito* is a sequel to the *Apology*. In the *Apology* we left Socrates condemned as an irreligious person and a corrupter of the young; in the *Crito* we find him refusing to infringe the laws of his country by falling in with a plan arranged by his friends for his escape from prison. This incident furnishes the motive for the dialogue; the scene is the prison hard by the court in which Socrates was condemned¹; the time early morning on the last day but one before his death and nearly a month after the trial². Thus in the biographical or chronological order the *Crito* is intermediate between the *Apology* and the *Phaedo*, in which last we catch the dying utterance of the sage of Athens. Accordingly in the arrangement of Plato's works ascribed to Thrasyllus the *Crito* comes in between the *Apology* and *Phaedo*, occupying the third place in the first tetralogy. This quartette of dialogues begins with the *Euthyphro*, wherein we find Socrates deserting the Lyceum for the King's Porch, because of his impending prosecution by Meletus. In the other and more philosophical division of the works of Plato, which was also current in antiquity, the *Crito* is fitly referred to the head of 'ethical' discourses.

In its construction the *Crito* is among the very simplest of Plato's dialogues, resembling the earlier form of the drama, in which only two actors figured on the stage. In style it is rhetorical rather than dialectical, accepting the received notions of justice and injustice, of law and of the duties of a citizen, without mystifying us by an attempt to analyse them.

1. Position of the *Crito* among the works of Plato.

2. Construction and style of the dialogue.

¹ *Phaedo* 59 D.

² *Xen. Mem.* IV. 8, § 2.

It may be considered as a specimen of that true rhetoric, which Plato deemed possible, the object of which should be to implant justice and temperance in the soul¹.

3. Date of composition.

With regard to the date of composition nothing can be affirmed, except that the Crito was probably written after the Apology. This may be inferred from the references which it appears to contain to that work². It might of course be argued that these apparent references to the Apology are really reminiscences of the actual words of Socrates on his trial, which must have lived in the memory of his hearers. But they tally with the Apology of Plato and do not tally with the Apology of Xenophon, whence it is probable that these references are literary rather than historical.

4. Historical basis of the Crito.

Just as the Apology may be seen to have a basis of fact from its curious touches of resemblance amid diversity to the Apology of Xenophon, so it is also with the Crito. We know from Xenophon³ that there was an attempt made by the friends of Socrates to smuggle him out of jail; and that author records that Socrates disposed of their solicitations by asking them whether they knew any spot outside the Athenian territory which was not accessible to death. Diogenes Laertius⁴ however, on the authority of Idomeneus, a disciple of Epicurus, ascribes the recommendation to escape from prison to Aeschines, the Socratic, instead of to Crito. But the advice is such as might well have been offered by more than one friend. We need not therefore attach much weight to the malicious suggestion of Idomeneus, that Plato suppressed the name of Aeschines, because he was annoyed at his reputation at the court of Dionysius. Socrates' interpretation of the dream in like manner is related by Diogenes in connection with Aeschines, perhaps on the same authority, though he does not in this case quote it⁵.

¹ Gorg. 504 D.

² Cp. Crito 45 B, μήτε δ' ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ κ.τ.λ. with Apol. 37 D, καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη ἐξελθόντι κ.τ.λ.; Crito 52 C, σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν κ.τ.λ. with Apol. 37 B, C.

³ Apol. § 23.

⁴ Diog. Laert. II. § 60, III. § 36.

⁵ See notes on 44 B, Ἡματί κεν κ.τ.λ., C, ἡμῶν προθυμουμένων.

The purpose of the *Crito* is manifestly to vindicate the character of Socrates as a citizen. He had been charged by his accusers with inculcating disrespect for the institutions of his country¹, and his philosophical admiration for the constitutions of Sparta and Crete was made no secret of². His dialectical analysis of accepted ideas was looked upon with suspicion as having the taint of treason. Thus in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes³ his supposed disciple, Pheidippides, is made to exclaim—

*ὥς ἡδὺ καινοῖς πράγμασιν καὶ δεξιόις ὀμιλεῖν,
καὶ τῶν καθεστώτων νόμων ὑπερφρονεῖν δύνασθαι.*

The same charge of treasonable tendencies was echoed, as Grote reminds us, by no less a person than Cato the Censor⁴, a man utterly out of sympathy with speculative philosophy. It is against this deep-rooted misconception that Plato sets himself in the *Crito* to deliver the memory of his master. To this end he introduces the famous personification of the laws and constitution of Athens, which Socrates is made to imagine as addressing to himself an impassioned harangue on the duties of a citizen to his country. Plato also urges, in proof of the patriotism of Socrates, his persistent residence within the walls of Athens⁵. No doubt Socrates was a true patriot in the best sense of the term; but, unless he has been sadly belied, he was no very warm adherent of democratic ideas. If the coins of humanity were severally worthless, he doubted whether they gained value from being massed in a heap⁶, thus differing from the opinion of Aristotle, who thought that the judgment of the multitude collectively might be more valuable than that of the individuals who composed it. We cannot therefore quite acquit Plato of

¹ Xen. Mem. I. 2, § 9.

² See note on 52 E, οὔτε Λακεδαιμόνα . . . οὔτε Κρήτην.

³ 1399, 1400.

⁴ Plutarch, Cato XXIII ad in., ὅς γε καὶ Σωκράτη φησὶ λάλον καὶ βίαιον γενόμενον ἐπιχειρεῖν, ᾧ τρόπῳ δυνατὸς ἦν, τυραννεῖν τῆς πατρίδος, καταλύοντα τὰ ἔθη καὶ πρὸς ἐναντίας τοῖς νόμοις δόξας ἔλκοντα καὶ μεθιστάντα τοὺς πολίτας.

⁵ See 52 B, 53 A.

⁶ D. L. II. § 34.

being animated in the Crito by the same desire which dominates the Menexenus, of showing how, when he was in the mood, he could rival the popular orators of Athens. In the Politicus the Eleatic Stranger, who is supposed to be the mouthpiece of Plato's own views, rather sneers at law in comparison with a wise and sovereign will. The very doctrine which is enforced in the Crito is referred to there as a specious commonplace¹, though afterwards this law-abidingness is admitted to be the best thing in the actual state of the world². But these later views are purely Platonic developments; and we must not forget how the Socrates of Xenophon³, when challenged by Hippias of Elis to give his own view with respect to justice, is content to identify justice with the observance of law. To the objection of Hippias that laws and their observance can be no great matter, because laws are often altered by the very men who framed them, Socrates replies that you might as well slight discipline in war on the ground that peace may afterwards be concluded. In the Memorabilia too, as at the close of the Crito, Socrates leads his hearer on from human enactments to the contemplation of those eternal laws 'which are not of to-day or yesterday.'

6. Its ethical importance. Doctrine of non-resistance to injuries.

Though the Crito is not professedly a speculative dialogue, it nevertheless possesses a profound philosophical importance owing to its anticipation of Christian ethics. Nothing can be more emphatic than the way in which the doctrine of non-resistance to injuries is laid down. 'Then one ought not,' says Socrates, 'to do wrong in return, nor to do ill to any man, no matter what one may suffer at men's hands. And see to

¹ Polit. 296 A, Οἷσθ' οὖν ἐπὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγον τὸν παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν λεγόμενον;

Οὐκ ἐννοῶ νῦν γ' οὕτως.

Καὶ μὴν εὐπρεπής. φασὶ γὰρ δὴ δεῖν, εἴ τις γινώσκει παρὰ τοὺς τῶν ἔμπροσθεν βελτίους νόμους, νομοθετεῖν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόλιν ἕκαστον πείσαντα, ἄλλως δὲ μή. With this contrast Crito 51 E, 52 A.

² Polit. 297 D, ad fin., Τὸ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους μηδὲν μηδένα τολμᾶν ποιεῖν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει . . . καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὀρθότατα καὶ κάλλιστ' ἔχον ὡς δεύτερον : cp. 300 B, ad fin.

³ Mem. IV. 4.

it, Crito, in assenting to this, that you do not assent contrary to your opinion. For I know that there are few who hold, or will hold, this opinion. Those then who have formed this opinion and those who have not cannot take counsel together, but must needs despise one another, when they view each other's counsels. Do you also then consider very carefully, whether you share with me and hold this opinion that I hold, and whether we are to start from this principle in our deliberations, that it is never right either to do wrong, or to do it in return, or to defend oneself when ill-treated by doing ill in return.'

But Socrates was not content merely to preach non-resistance to evil; he also practised it. If the following anecdotes are partly apocryphal, they at least serve to show the impression that was left of his character. Thus it is related that his zeal in controversy sometimes led to his being cuffed and otherwise maltreated by disputants with less relish for truth than himself: but that he bore these rebuffs with exemplary patience. When someone expressed surprise at his allowing himself to be kicked, he asked whether if a donkey kicked him, he ought to take the law of it¹. One day also when Xanthippe tore off his cloak in the market-place, his friends advised him to defend himself with his fists; but the sage replied, 'Yes indeed; to have you crying out, "Go it, Socrates! Go it, Xanthippe!"'² There is a marked difference of tone between this imperturbable good-humour of Socrates and the meekness of a Christian martyr: but the two coincide in their effect on conduct. It was the life, and not merely the teaching, of Socrates that so powerfully influenced his disciples. We may gather the reverence that was felt for his character from the words of Aristippus to Plato, when he deemed him guilty of some presumptuous utterance—'Our friend would never have said *that*'³.

7. Socrates practised what he preached.

¹ D. L. II. § 21, on the authority of Demetrius of Byzantium.

² D. L. II. § 37.

³ Arist. Rhet. II. 23, § 12.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ

[ἡ περὶ πρακτέου, ἠθικός.]



Crito brings a word to Socrates in prison that the ship from Delos, the arrival of which portended death to him, has been seen off Sunium.

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ΣΩ. Τί τηνικάδε ἀφίξει, ὦ Κρίτων ; ἡ οὐ πρὸ ἔτι ἐστίν ;

I. Intro-
duction.

43 A-44 B.

ΚΡ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα ;

ΚΡ. Ὅρθρος βαθύς.

ΣΩ. Θαυμάζω, ὅπως ἠθέλησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακούσαι.

ΚΡ. Ξυνήθης ἤδη μοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις δεῦρο φοιτᾶν, καί τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται ὑπ' ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩ. Ἄρτι δὲ ἤκεις ἡ πάλαι ;

ΚΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.

B ΣΩ. Εἶτα πῶς οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπήγειράς με, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ παρακάθησαι ;

ΚΡ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἤθελον ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανόμενος, ὥς ἡδέως καθεύδεις· καὶ ἐπίτηδές σε οὐκ ἤγειρον, ἵνα ὥς ἡδιστα διάγοις. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δή σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νῦν παρεστῶσιν ξυμφορᾷ, ὥς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πρᾶως φέρεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Κρίτων, πλημμελὲς εἴη ἀγανακτεῖν τηλικούτου ὄντα, εἰ δεῖ ἤδη τελευτᾶν.

ΚΡ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τηλικούτοι ἐν τοιαύταις **C** ξυμφοραῖς ἀλίσκονται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἡ ἡλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ.

ΣΩ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ οὕτω πρὸς ἀφίξει ;

ΚΡ. Ἀγγελίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φέρων χαλεπήν, οὐ σοί, ὥς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις πᾶσι καὶ χαλεπήν καὶ βαρεῖαν, ἣν ἐγώ, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς βαρύντατ' ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι.

ΣΩ. Τίνα ταύτην ; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκεται ἐκ Δήλου, οὗ δεῖ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με ; **D**

ΚΡ. Οὐ τοι δὴ ἀφίκεται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μέν μοι ἤξειν τήμερον ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἤκοντές τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ καταλιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων [τῶν ἀγγέλων], ὅτι ἤξει τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ εἰς αὔριον ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτᾶν.

Socrates declares, on the strength of a dream, that it will not reach Athens until the next day.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Κρίτων, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ. εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτῃ ἔστω. οὐ μέντοι οἶμαι ἤξειν αὐτὸ | τήμερον. **44**

ΚΡ. Πόθεν τοῦτο τεκμαίρει ;

ΣΩ. Ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ. τῇ γάρ που ὑστεραίᾳ δεῖ με ἀποθνήσκειν ἢ ἢ ἂν ἔλθῃ τὸ πλοῖον.

ΚΡ. Φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἤξειν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἔκ τινος ἐνυπνίου, ὃ ἐώρακα ὀλίγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτός· καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τινὶ οὐκ ἐγείραί με.

ΚΡ. Ἦν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον ;

ΣΩ. Ἐδόκει τίς μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα καλὴ καὶ
 Β εὐειδής, λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν,
 ὦ Σώκρατες, Ἡματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἴκοιο.

ΚΡ. Ὡς ἄτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐναργὲς μὲν οὖν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων.

You must escape, Socrates. What will the world think of us if we let you die ?

ΚΡ. Λίαν γε, ὥς ἔοικεν. ἀλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε Σώκρατες, Π. Crito's
 ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ σώθητι· ὥς ἐμοί, ἐὰν σὺ argument.
 ἀποθάνῃς, οὐ μία ξυμφορὰ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ 44 B-46 A.
 ἐστερηῆσθαι τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου, οἷον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μὴ ποτε
 εὐρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω, οἳ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μὴ
 C σαφῶς ἴσασιν, ὥς οἷός τ' ὦν σε σώζειν, εἰ ἡθέλον
 ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελῆσαι. καίτοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη
 ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ
 φίλους ; οὐ γὰρ πείσονται οἱ πολλοί, ὥς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ
 ἡθέλησας ἀπιέναι ἐνθένδε ἡμῶν προθυμουμένων.

Why should we heed the opinion of the world, Crito ? The world is not the arbiter of good and ill.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἡμῖν, ὦ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς τῶν
 πολλῶν δόξης μέλει ; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὦν μᾶλλον
 ἄξιον φροντίζειν, ἡγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπραχθαι, ὥσπερ
 ἂν πραχθῇ.

D ΚΡ. Ἀλλ' ὁρᾷς δὴ ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τῆς
 τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει, αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνί,
 ὅτι οἷός τ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν
 ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, ἐὰν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς
 διαβεβλημένος ᾖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ ὥφελον, ὦ Κρίτων, οἰοί τε εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἰοί τε ἦσαν [αὐ] καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα, καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἶχε. νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἰοί τε· οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὔτε ἄφρονα δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, ποιούσι δὲ τοῦτο ὃ τι ἂν τύχωσιν.

Do not fear the consequences to us your friends. We are ready to spend money, and will provide for your reception abroad.

(2) Socrates need not fear the consequences to his friends.

ΚΡ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχέτω· τάδε δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, **E** εἰπέ μοι. ἆρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεῖ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, μή, ἂν σὺ ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθῃς, οἱ συκοφάνται ἡμῖν πράγματα παρέχωσιν ὥς σὲ ἐνθένδε ἐκκλέψασι, καὶ ἀναγκασθῶμεν ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ συχνὰ χρήματα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι πρὸς τούτοις παθεῖν; εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον | φοβεῖ, ἔασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν· ἡμεῖς γάρ **45** πον δίκαιοι ἐσμεν σώσαντές σε κινδυνεύειν τοῦτον τὸν κίνδυνον καί, ἂν δέῃ, ἔτι τούτου μείζω. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθεύμαι, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.

ΚΡ. Μήτε τοίνυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ τὰργύριόν ἐστιν, ὃ θέλουσι λαβόντες τινὲς σῶσαί σε καὶ ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐνθένδε. ἔπειτα οὐχ ὀρᾷς τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας ὥς εὐτελεῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν δέοι ἐπ' αὐτοὺς πολλοῦ ἀργυρίου; σοὶ δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα, ὥς ἐγὼ **B** οἶμαι, ἱκανά· ἔπειτα καὶ εἴ τι ἐμοῦ κηδόμενος οὐκ οἶει δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τὰμά, ξένοι οὗτοι ἐνθάδε ἔτοιμοι ἀναλίσκειν· εἰς δὲ καὶ κεκόμικεν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀργύριον ἱκανόν, Σιμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος· ἔτοιμος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνν. ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, μήτε ταῦτα φοβούμενος ἀποκάμῃς σταντὸν σῶσαι, μήτε ὃ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ,

δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐξελθὼν ὃ τι
C χρῶσθαι σαυτῷ· πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἂν
 ἀφίκη ἀγαπήσουσί σε· ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ εἰς Θετταλίαν ἰέναι,
 εἰσὶν ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖ ξένοι, οἳ σε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσονται καὶ
 ἀσφάλειάν σοι παρέξονται, ὥστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν
 κατὰ Θετταλίαν.

*Lastly, Socrates, your duty to your children demands that you
 should save yourself; and we shall be disgraced if you do not.*

Ἔτι δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν ^{(3) Appeal to duty.}
 πρᾶγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι, ἐξὸν σωθῆναι· καὶ τοιαῦτα
 σπεύδεις περὶ σάντων γενέσθαι, ἅπερ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροί
 σου σπεύσαιέν τε καὶ ἔσπευσαν σὲ διαφθεῖραι βουλόμενοι.
 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς νείεις τοὺς σαυτοῦ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς
D προδιδόναι, οὓς σοι ἐξὸν καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεῦσαι
 οἰχήσῃ καταλιπών, καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὃ τι ἂν τύχῃσι,
 τοῦτο πράξουσιν· τεύξονται δέ, ὥς τὸ εἰκός, τοιούτων
 οἷάπερ εἴωθε γίνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις περὶ τοὺς
 ὀρφανούς. ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας, ἢ ξυνδιατα-
 λαιπωρεῖν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς
 τὰ ῥαθυμότατα αἰρεῖσθαι· χρὴ δέ, ἅπερ ἂν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς
 καὶ ἀνδρείος ἔλοιτο, ταῦτα αἰρεῖσθαι, φάσκοντά γε δὴ
 ἀρετῆς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ὥς ἔγωγε καὶ
E ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι,
 μὴ δόξῃ ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρία τινὶ τῇ
 ἡμετέρᾳ πεπραῆχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ
 δικαστήριον ὥς εἰσῆλθες ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ
 ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης ὥς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτί,
 ὥσπερ κατάγελως τῆς πράξεως, κακία τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρία
46 τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ | διαπεφευγῆναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν, οἷτινές σε οὐχὶ
 ἐσώσαμεν οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτόν, οἶόν τε ὃν καὶ δυνατόν, εἴ τι

καὶ σμικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἦν. ταῦτ' οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅρα μὴ ἅμα τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχροῦ ἢ σοί τε καὶ ἡμῖν. ἀλλὰ βουλευέσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλευέσθαι ἔτι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλευσθαι, μία δὲ βουλή· τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς πάντα ταῦτα δεῖ πεπράχθαι. εἰ δ' ἔτι περιμενοῦμεν, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκέτι οἶόν τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθου μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποίει.

Your zeal is invaluable, Crito, if only it be rightly directed. We must therefore examine the question in the light of reason.

III. So-
crates'
reply.
46 B-54 E.

ΣΩ. ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ ἀξία, Β εἰ μετὰ τινος ὀρθότητος εἴη· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅσῳ μείζων, τοσοῦτ' χαλεπωτέρα. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς, εἴτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μή· ὥς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον νῦν ἀλλὰ καὶ αἰεὶ τοιοῦτος, οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, ὃς ἂν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνεται. τοὺς δὲ λόγους, οὓς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν, ἐπειδὴ μοι ἤδε ἡ τύχη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονται μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ C τιμῶ ὅσπερ καὶ πρότερον· ὦν ἐὰν μὴ βελτίῳ ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι οὐ μὴ σοι ξυγχωρήσω, οὐδ' ἂν πλείῳ τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἢ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὥσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται, δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις.

Were we right in admitting before that not all opinions are to be attended to, but only those of the wise?

(1) Not all
opinions
are to be
attended
to, but only
those of
the wise.

Πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκοποῖμεθα αὐτά ; Εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοιμεν, ὃν σὺ λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο ἐκάστοτε ἢ οὐ, ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὐ· D

ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατὰδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἄλλως ἔνεκα λόγου ἐλέγετο, ἣν δὲ παιδιὰ καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς ; ἐπιθυμῶ δ' ἔγωγε ἐπισκέψασθαι, ᾧ Κρίτων, κοινῇ μετὰ σοῦ, εἴ τί μοι ἀλλοιότερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδὴ ᾧδε ἔχω, ἢ ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἐάσομεν χαίρειν ἢ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγετο δέ πως, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἐκάστοτε ᾧδε ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν, ἅς οἱ ἄνθρωποι δοξάζουσι,

Εἰ ζοῦσι, δέοι τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μή. τοῦτο πρὸς θεῶν, ᾧ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι ; σὺ γάρ, ὅσα γε τὰνθρώπεια, ἐκτὸς εἰ τοῦ μέλλειν
 47 | ἀποθνήσκειν αὔριον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σε παρακρούοι ἢ παροῦσα ξυμφορά· σκοπεῖ δὴ οὐχὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρὴ τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν, τὰς δ' οὐ ; οὐδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν, τῶν δ' οὐ ; τί φῆς ; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται ;

ΚΡ. Καλῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς μή ;

ΚΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Χρησταὶ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων ;

ΚΡ. Πῶς δ' οὐ ;

As in questions of bodily health we attend to the opinion of the expert, and not to that of the many, so should we do in the case of justice.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο ; γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς
 Β ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἐνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου, ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὢν ;

KP. Ἐνὸς μόνου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπά-
ζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς
τῶν πολλῶν.

KP. Δῆλα δῆ.

ΣΩ. Ταύτῃ ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ
ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ἥ ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ
καὶ ἐπαύοντι, μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ ζύμπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις.

KP. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ C
τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν
λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαύοντων, ἄρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται ;

KP. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἔστι τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο ; καὶ ποῖ τείνει, καὶ
εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος ;

KP. Δῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα· τοῦτο γὰρ διόλλυσιν.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα, ὧ Κρίτων,
οὕτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διΐωμεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων
καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχυρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν,
περὶ ὧν νῦν ἡ βουλή ἡμῖν ἐστί, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν
δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔπεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτήν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ D
ἐνός, εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἐπαῖων, ὃν δεῖ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ
φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ζύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους ; ᾧ εἰ μὴ
ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκείνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα,
ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο.
ἢ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο ;

KP. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὧ Σώκρατες.

*For justice is the health of the soul, and is more important than
the health of the body.*

ΣΩ. Φέρε δῆ, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ μὲν βέλτιον

γιγνόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον, διολέ-
σωμεν πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαϊόντων δόξῃ, ἅρα βιωτὸν
E ἡμῖν ἐστὶ διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ; ἔστι δέ που τοῦτο τὸ
σῶμα· ἢ οὐχί;

KP. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ
διεφθαρμένου σώματος;

KP. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου ἄρα ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμέ-
νον, ᾧ τὸ ἀδικον μὲν λωβᾶται, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνύνησιν;
ἢ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο, ὃ τί
48 ποτ' ἐστὶ τῶν | ἡμετέρων, περὶ ὃ ἢ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἢ δι-
καιοσύνη ἐστίν;

KP. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τιμιώτερον;

KP. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ βέλτιστε, πάννυ ἡμῖν οὕτω φρον-
τιστέον, τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὃ τι ὁ ἐπαῖων
περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὃ εἶς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἢ ἀλήθεια.
ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ, εἰσηγούμενος
τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν
δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων.

*But the many may kill us, if we neglect their opinion. True: but
it is not mere life, but a good life, that is important. And a
good life is a noble and just life.*

Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, φαίη γ' ἂν τις, οἷοί τ' εἰσὶν ἡμᾶς οἱ
πολλοὶ ἀποκτινύναι;

B KP. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα· φαίη γὰρ ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῇ λέγεις. ἀλλ', ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὗτός τε ὁ
λόγος, ὃν διεληλύθαμεν, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὅμοιος εἶναι τῷ καὶ

πρότερον· καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκοπεῖ, εἰ ἔτι μένει ἡμῖν ἢ οὐ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

KP. Ἀλλὰ μένει.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταῦτόν ἐστι, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;

KP. Μένει.

The only question then for us is whether it is just for me to attempt to escape or not. Let us endeavour to agree about this.

(2) His duty is to stay, not to go.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦτο σκεπτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε πειράσθαι ἐξιέναι μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων, ἢ οὐ δίκαιον· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνεται **C** δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐώμεν. ἄς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περὶ τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ παίδων τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων, σκέμματα ἢ τῶν ῥαδίως ἀποκτινύντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἂν, εἰ οἱοί τε ἦσαν, οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῶ, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῖν δ', ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἰρεῖ, μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ἢ ἢ ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράττομεν καὶ χρήματα τελούντες τούτοις τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε ἐξάξουσιν καὶ χάριτας, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἢ τῇ **D** ἀληθείᾳ ἀδικήσομεν πάντα ταῦτα ποιούντες· καὶ φαινόμεθα ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δέη ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὐτ' εἰ ἀποθνήσκειν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας, οὔτε ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.

KP. Καλῶς μὲν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅρα δὲ τί δρῶμεν.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὦ γαθέ, κοινῇ, καὶ εἴ πῃ ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε, καὶ σοι πείσομαι· εἰ δὲ μή, παῦσαι ἤδη, ὦ μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν **E** αὐτὸν λόγον, ὡς χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ

ἀπιέναι· ὥς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πείσας σε ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος.

Were we right in laying down the principle that we must never do injustice? Yes. Not even when it is done to us? It seems so. And is not doing ill to others unjust? It is. Revenge therefore is absolutely unlawful, in spite of what the many think and say. If you admit this, be sure you do so with a whole heart : for everything hinges upon it. I do : say on.

Ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐάν σοι ἱκανῶς
49 λέγεται, καὶ πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ | ἐρωτώμενον, ἧ ἂν
μάλιστα οἷ.

KP. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι.

ΣΩ. Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμέν ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι,
ἢ τινὶ μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ, τινὶ δὲ οὐ; ἢ οὐδαμῶς τό γε
ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλόν, ὥς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν
τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὡμολογήθη; [ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο.]
ἢ πᾶσαι ἡμῖν ἐκεῖναι αἱ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίαι ἐν ταῖσδε
ταῖς ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσί, καὶ πάλαι, ὦ
Κρίτων, ἄρα τηλικοῖδε [γέροντες] ἄνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους
B σπουδῇ διαλεγόμενοι ἐλάβομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν
διαφέροντες; ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει, ὥσπερ τότε
ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν, εἴτε φασὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μή; καὶ εἴτε δεῖ
ἡμᾶς ἔτι τῶνδε χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἴτε καὶ πραότερα,
ὅμως τό γε ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχροὺν
τυγχάνει ὃν παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμέν ἢ οὐ;

KP. Φαμέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

KP. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ
οἶονται, ἐπειδὴ γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

C KP. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δῆ, κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἢ οὐ;

ΚΡ. Οὐ δεῖ δῆ πον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὥς οἱ πολλοί φασι, δίκαιον ἢ οὐ δίκαιον;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γάρ πον κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.

ΚΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὅτιοῦν πάσχη ὑπ' αὐτῶν. καὶ ὅρα, ὦ Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν, ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν **D** ὁμολογῇς. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἷς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μὴ, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὀρώντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλευόμενα. σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ εὖ μάλα, πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὥς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρώντα κακῶς· ἢ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι **E** δοκεῖ, σοὶ δ' εἴ πῃ ἄλλη δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. εἰ δὲ ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρόσθεν, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐμμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγε.

Is it just to keep one's covenants? Yes. But if I escape from prison, shall I not break my covenants, and do ill to the city? I am not prepared to say, Socrates.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ αὖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δ' ἐρωτῶ· πότερον ἂν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαια ὄντα ποιητέον ἢ ἐξαπατητέον;

ΚΡ. Ποιητέον.

ΣΩ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει, ἀπιόντες ἐνθένδε ἡμεῖς μὴ
 50 πείσαντες τὴν | πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινὰς ποιοῦμεν, καὶ
 ταῦτα οὓς ἥκιστα δεῖ, ἢ οὐ; καὶ ἐμμένομεν οἷς ὠμολογή-
 σαμεν δικαίοις οὖσιν ἢ οὐ;

ΚΡ. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς ὃ
 ἐρωτᾷς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ.

*Then look at the matter in this way. Suppose that, when I was
 in the act of escaping, the laws and commonwealth were to
 come to me and say—‘What are you about, Socrates? Are
 you not doing your best to destroy us and the city?’ Am I to
 tell them that the city was doing a wrong to me?*

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὧδε σκόπει. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε (3) Personi-
 εἶτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἴθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, ἐλθόντες fication of
 οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστάντες ἔροιντο, the com-
 Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἄλλο τι monwealth
 ἢ τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ, ᾧ ἐπιχειρεῖς, διανοεῖ τοὺς τε νόμους and the
 B ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι καὶ ζύμπασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἢ laws.
 δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε ἔτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ
 ἀνατετράφθαι, ἐν ᾗ ἂν αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι μηδὲν ἰσχύσιν,
 ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροί τε γίνωνται καὶ διαφθείρωνται;
 Τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα;
 πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν τις ἔχοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ, εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ
 τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὃς τὰς δίκας τὰς δικα-
 σθείσας προστάττει κυρίας εἶναι. ἢ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς
 C ὅτι Ἡδίκη γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἢ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην
 ἔκρινε; Ταῦτα ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν;

ΚΡ. Ταῦτα νῆ Δί, ὦ Σώκρατες.

But they may reply—‘Is this your agreement, Socrates? Were you not born and bred and educated under our auspices? If the child has not equal rights as against his parent, much less has the citizen as against his country. It is your business simply to submit.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ καὶ ταῦτα ὡμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοί; ἢ ἐμμένειν ταῖς δίκαις αἷς ἂν ἡ πόλις δικάζῃ; εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζοιμεν λεγόντων, ἴσως ἂν εἴποιεν ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλ’ ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἴωθας χρῆσθαι τῷ ἐρωτᾷν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν D ἡμῖν καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρῶτον μὲν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ δι’ ἡμῶν ἐλάβανε τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέ σε; φράσον οὖν, τούτοις ἡμῶν, [τοῖς νόμοις] τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους, μέμφει τι ὥς οὐ καλῶς ἔχουσιν; Οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίην ἂν. Ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν, ἐν ἣ καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύθης; ἢ οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτοις τεταγμένοι [νόμοι], παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ σε ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν; Καλῶς, φαίην ἂν. Εἶεν. ἐπειδὴ E δὲ ἐγένου τε καὶ ἐξετράφης καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης, ἔχois ἂν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον μὲν ὥς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἦσθα καὶ ἐκγονος καὶ δοῦλος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ εἰ τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει, ἂρ’ ἐξ ἴσου οἶε εἶναι σοὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἄττ’ ἂν ἡμεῖς σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἶε δίκαιον εἶναι; ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοὶ τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην, εἴ σοι ὦν ἐτύγχανε, ὥστε, ἅπερ πάσχοις, ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν, οὔτε κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν οὔτε | τυπτό- 51 μενον ἀντιτύπτειν οὔτε ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά· πρὸς δὲ

τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐξέσται σοι, ὥστε, ἔάν σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι, καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καθ' ὅσον δύνασαι ἐπιχειρήσεις ἀνταπολλύναι, καὶ φήσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, ὃ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος ; ἢ οὕτως εἰ σοφός, ὥστε λέληθέ σε ὅτι μητρός τε καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων ἀπάντων τιμιώτερόν ἐστιν ἢ πατρὶς καὶ σεμνότερον καὶ ἀγιώτερον καὶ ἐν μείζονι μοίρᾳ καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις

B τοῖς νῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπέειπεν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσαν ἢ πατέρα, καὶ ἢ πείθειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ, καὶ πᾶσχειν, ἔάν τι προστάτῃ παθεῖν, ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντα, ἔάν τε τύπτεσθαι ἔάν τε δεῖσθαι, ἔάν τε εἰς πόλεμον ἄγῃ τρωθησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμενον, ποιητέον ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεικτέον οὐδὲ ἀναχωρητέον οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ

C πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ ἢ πόλις καὶ ἢ πατρίς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε, βιάζεσθαι δ' οὐχ ὅσιον οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἔτι ἥττον τὴν πατρίδα ; Τί φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων ; ἀληθῇ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους, ἢ οὐ ;

ΚΡ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

'After all we had done for you we still left you free to go or stay. By staying you have declared in fact that you are content with us. And if you try to do violence to us now, we declare you guilty of impiety, ingratitude and breach of contract.'

ΣΩ. Σκόπει τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαῖεν ἂν ἴσως οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῇ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δρᾶν ἃ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς. ἡμεῖς γάρ σε γεννῇ-

σαντες, ἐκθρέψαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἀπάντων
 ὦν οἱοί τ' ἡμεν καλῶν σοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι πολίταις,
 ὁμως προαγορεύομεν τῷ ἔξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίων **D**
 τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὴν δοκιμασθῇ καὶ ἴδῃ τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει
 πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ᾧ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν
 ἡμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπιέναι ὅποι ἂν βού-
 ληται. καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν [τῶν νόμων] ἐμποδὼν ἐστὶν
 οὐδ' ἀπαγορεύει, ἐάν τέ τις βούληται ὑμῶν εἰς ἀποικίαν
 ἵεναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκοιμεν ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, ἐάν τε
 μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσέ ποι ἔλθῶν, ἵεναι ἐκεῖσε ὅποι ἂν βού-
 ληται, ἔχοντα τὰ αὐτοῦ. ὅς δ' ἂν ὑμῶν παραμείνῃ, ὁρῶν **E**
 ὃν τρόπον ἡμεῖς τὰς τε δίκας δικάζομεν καὶ τὰλλα τὴν
 πόλιν διοικοῦμεν, ἥδη φαμὲν τοῦτον ὠμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ
 ἡμῖν ἂν ἡμεῖς κελεύωμεν ποιήσῃ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ
 πειθόμενον τριχῇ φαμὲν ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννηταῖς οὖσιν
 ἡμῖν οὐ πείθεται, καὶ ὅτι τροφεῦσι, καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσας
 ἡμῖν πείθεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ
 καλῶς τι ποιοῦμεν, | προτιθέντων ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως **52**
 ἐπιταττόντων ποιεῖν ἂν κελεύωμεν, ἀλλὰ ἐφιέντων
 δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ πείθειν ἡμᾶς ἢ ποιεῖν τούτων οὐδέτερα
 ποιεῖ.

'To you, Socrates, above all men, does this argument apply. For you have been distinguished by your fondness for the city, and have raised children here. Moreover you might have had your sentence commuted for banishment. But you talked big during your trial about braving death: whereas now you are meanly running away, like a slave from his master.

Ταύταις δὴ φαμεν καὶ σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐνέξεσθαι, εἴπερ ποιήσεις ἂ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἀθηναίων σέ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. Εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ εἴπομι, διὰ τί δὴ; ἴσως ἂν μου δικαίως καθάπτουντο,

λέγοντες ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὠμολογηκῶς τυγχάνω ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν. φαῖεν γὰρ
B ἂν ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, μεγάλα ἡμῖν τούτων τεκμήριά ἐστιν, ὅτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἡρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ μὴ σοι διαφερόντως ἡρεσκε, καὶ οὗτ' ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώποτε ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξήλθες, [ὅτι μὴ ἀπαξ εἰς Ἴσθμόν,] οὔτε ἄλλοσε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μὴ ποι στρατευσόμενος, οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσω πώποτε, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδ' ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς σοι ἱκανοὶ
C ἤμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὕτω σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἡρώυ, καὶ ὠμολόγεις καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύεσθαι, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ παίδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποιήσω, ὡς ἀρεσκούσης σοι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι τοίνυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι, εἰ ἐβούλου, καὶ ὅπερ νῦν ἀκούσης τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἐκούσης ποιῆσαι. σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκαλλωπίζον ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν, εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε, ἀλλ' ἡρώυ, ὡς ἔφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον· νῦν δὲ οὗτ' ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπει,
D ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθεῖραι, πράττεις τε ἅπερ ἂν δοῦλος φανλότατος πράξειεν, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας τε καὶ τὰς ὁμολογίας, καθ' ἃς ἡμῖν ξυνέθου πολιτεύεσθαι.

‘How then can you deny that you are breaking a covenant, which you were neither forced nor cajoled nor hurried into? In spite of your praise of Lacedaemon and Crete, it is Athens that you have always chosen to live in. Then abide by your agreement to the end.

Πρῶτον [μὲν] οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀπόκριναι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν φάσκοντές σε ὠμολογηκέναι πολιτεύεσθαι καθ'

ἡμᾶς ἔργῳ, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγῳ, ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ. Τί φῶμεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁμολογῶμεν;

ΚΡ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἂν φαῖεν, ἢ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις, οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ἢ ὁμολογήσας οὐδὲ ἀπατηθεὶς οὐδὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἀναγκασθεὶς βουλευσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἔτεσιν ἐβδομήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἐξῆν σοι ἀπιέναι, εἰ μὴ ἡρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς μηδὲ δίκαιαι ἐφαίνοντό σοι αἱ ὁμολογίαι εἶναι. σὺ δὲ οὔτε Λακεδαιμόνα προηροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἃς δὴ ἐκάστοτε φῆς εὖνομεῖσθαι, οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐδὲ τῶν | βαρβαρικῶν, ἀλλ' ἐλάττω ἐξ αὐτῆς 53 ἀπεδήμησας ἢ οἱ χωλοὶ τε καὶ τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι· οὕτω σοι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἤρεσκεν ἢ πόλις τε καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὅτι· τίνοι γὰρ ἂν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ νόμων; νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμμενεῖς τοῖς ὁμολογημένοις; ἐὰν ἡμῖν γε πείθῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός γε ἔσει ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξελθών.

‘For what good will come of your transgression? Your friends will run the risk of exile or confiscation of property. And you must either go to law-abiding cities, where you will be looked upon with mistrust, or else to lawless Thessaly, where they may relish the story of your escape—so long as you do not offend them. You will spend your last years there on sufferance like a parasite. And then how about the talk of virtue?’

Σκόπει γὰρ δὴ, ταῦτα παραβὰς καὶ ἑξαμαρτάνων τι τούτων τί ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσει σαντὸν ἢ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τοὺς σαντοῦ. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύουσιν γέ σου οἱ Β ἐπιτήδαιοι καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγειν καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς πόλεως ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδόν τι δῆλον· αὐτὸς δὲ

- πρώτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πόλεων ἔλθῃς, ἢ Θήβαζε ἢ Μέγαράδε—εὐνομοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφοτέραι—, πολέμιος ἦξῃς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, καὶ ὅσοι περ κήδονται τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων, ὑποβλέψονται σε διαφθορέα ἡγούμενοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς
- C** δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν, ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην δικάσαι· ὅστις γὰρ νόμων διαφθορεὺς ἐστι, σφόδρα πονεῖν δόξειεν ἂν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεὺς εἶναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξει τὰς τε εὐνομουμένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους; καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦντι ἄρα ἄξιόν σοι ζῆν ἔσται; ἢ πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος—τίνας λόγους, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ οὐσπερ ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστου ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ
- D** οὐκ οἶει ἄσχημον φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα; οἶεσθαί γε χρή. Ἄλλ' ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἦξῃς δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἡδέως σου ἀκούοιεν ὡς γελοῖως ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἀπεδίδρασκες σκευὴν τέ τινα περιθέμενος, ἢ διφθέραν λαβὼν ἢ ἄλλα οἷα δὴ εἰώθασιν ἐνσκευάζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαντοῦ μεταλλάξας.
- E** ὅτι δὲ γέρων ἀνὴρ σμικροῦ χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ ὄντος, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἐτόλμησας οὕτω γλίσχρως ἐπιθυμεῖν ζῆν, νόμους τοὺς μεγίστους παραβάς, οὐδεὶς ὃς ἐρεῖ; ἴσως, ἂν μή τινα λυπῇς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀκούσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαντοῦ. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων· τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐχόμενος ἐν Θετταλίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἀποδεδημηκὼς εἰς Θετταλίαν; λόγοι δὲ ἐκείνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς
- 54 ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν | ἔσονται;

'But you wish to live for your children's sake! Do you mean to give them the advantage of an education in Thessaly? Or will your friends look after them, if you go to another country, but not if you go to the other world?'

Ἄλλὰ δὴ τῶν παίδων ἕνεκα βούλει ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψῃς καὶ παιδεύσῃς; τί δέ; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγὼν θρέψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ξένους ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτό σου ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ζῶντος βέλτιον θρέφονται καὶ παιδεύονται, μὴ ξυνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδειοι οἱ σοὶ ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν. πότερον ἂν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἀποδημήσῃς, ἐπιμελήσονται, ἂν δὲ εἰς Ἄιδου ἀποδημήσῃς, οὐχὶ **B** ἐπιμελήσονται; εἴπερ γέ τι ὄφελος αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τῶν σοι φασκόντων ἐπιτηδεῖων εἶναι, οἷσθαί γε χρή.

'No, Socrates, take advice from us who nurtured you, and set neither children nor your own life before justice, that so, sinned against, but not sinning, you may with a clear conscience confront our brethren, the eternal laws of the world beyond.'

Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, πειθόμενος ἡμῖν τοῖς σοῖς τροφεῦσι μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς Ἄιδου ἐλθὼν ἔχῃς πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντι ἄμεινον εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὀσιώτερον, οὐδὲ ἄλλω τῶν σῶν οὐδενί, οὔτε ἐκείσε ἀφικομένῳ ἄμεινον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἡδικοημένος ἄπει, ἂν ἀπίης, οὐχ ὑφ' ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων· ἂν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὕτως αἰσχυρῶς **C** ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας τε καὶ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τούτους οὓς ἤκιστα ἔδει, σαυτόν τε καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τέ σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν

ζῶντι, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ οἱ ἐν ᾿Αιδου νόμοι οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέξονται, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπε-
χειρήσας ἀπολέσαι τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μή σε πείσῃ

D Κρίτων ποιεῖν ἃ λέγει μᾶλλον ἢ ἡμεῖς.

Such, Crito, is the strain that keeps humming in my ears, and renders them impervious to ought else. Nevertheless, if you have anything to say against this, say on. I have not, Socrates. So be it then, since God so guides us.

Ταῦτα, ὦ φίλε ἐταῖρε Κρίτων, εἴ σοι ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὕτη ἡ ἡχὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν· ἀλλὰ ἴσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἐάν τι λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἐρεῖς. ὅμως μέντοι εἴ τι οἶσι πλέον ποιήσῃν, λέγε.

ΚΡ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

E ΣΩ. Ἦεα τοίνυν, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτη, ἐπειδὴ ταύτη ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται.

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BY

ST. GEORGE STOCK, M.A.

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AMEN CORNER, E.C.

NOTES

KPITON] An Athenian of the deme of Alopece, to which Socrates also belonged. Throughout life he played to the philosopher the part of a 'fidus Achates.' It is recorded indeed on the authority of Demetrius of Byzantium, a writer of whom we know very little, that Crito took Socrates away from his trade and educated him, being struck with his mental ability (Diog. Laert. II. § 20, ad fin.). But the fact that they were contemporaries (Apol. 33 E; cp. Euthyd. 272 B—D) renders this story improbable. However that may be, the wealth of Crito was always at the service of his friend. It was Crito who ministered to his wants through life (D. L. II. § 121); it was Crito who went bail for his appearance before the dicasts (Phaedo 115 D); it was Crito among others who guaranteed to pay a fine for him, if the sentence of death were commuted (Apol. 38 B); and finally it is Crito who in this dialogue is represented as bribing the jailer and making other arrangements for the escape of Socrates. In return for this affectionate solicitude Socrates gave Crito good advice. He pointed out to Crito how to secure himself against the machinations of informers by keeping an honest man to act as a sort of watch-dog (Xen. Mem. II. 9). The intimate relations between the pair of friends is graphically indicated in the Phaedo (60 A, B), where Socrates, on the morning before he drank the hemlock, wishing to be rid of the clamorous lamentations of poor Xanthippe, gave a glance at Crito and said, 'Let somebody take her home'; 'and so some of Crito's people took her away, crying and beating her breast.' A friend in those days was dearer than a wife; and so it fell to Crito to close the eyes of Socrates, when they were fixed in death (Phaedo 118).

The principal occupation of Crito seems to have been the care of his property, which he did not let the pursuit of philosophy interfere with (Euthyd. 304 C). He was possessed of landed estates (Euthyd. 291 E). We read in this dialogue (45 C, 53 D) that he had friends in Thessaly, with whom he offered Socrates a safe retreat, if he would fly there. Crito had two sons, Critobulus and another considerably younger (Euthyd. 306 D), about whose education he was anxious.

Although the qualities of his heart were more conspicuous than those of his head, Crito was not without pretensions to philosophy, his admiration for which he is made naively to express in the Euthydemus (304 C)—'Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, χαρίεν γέ τι πράγμα ἐστὶν ἡ φιλοσοφία. Nor was this admiration without result, if we may credit the statement of Diogenes Laertius (II. § 121), that he was the author of a book containing seventeen dialogues on the following thoroughly Socratic subjects—

1. That goodness does not come by nature. 2. On self-aggrandisement. 3. What is expediency?—or the Statesman. 4. On the beautiful. 5. On doing ill. 6. On tidiness. 7. On law. 8. On the divine nature. 9. On arts. 10. On social intercourse. 11. On wisdom. 12. Protagoras or the Statesman. 13. On letters. 14. On poetry. 15. On learning. 16. On knowing or about knowledge. 17. What is knowledge?

ἡ περὶ πρακτέου] That is to say, the discussion turns upon a point of conduct.

ἠθικός] This is one of the eight 'infimae species' to which the works of Plato were referred by the ancients, as the result of a subtle process of division. The Apology was thrown under the same head.

43 A τηνικάδε] 'At such an hour!' Cp. Prot. 310 B, τοῦ ἕνεκα τηνικάδε ἀφίκου; In Phaedo 76 B, αὐριον τηνικάδε, it means simply 'at this time,' without the exclamatory force which it has here. τηνικάδε is a strengthened form of τηνίκα, the demonstrative corresponding to the interrogative πηνίκα and the relative ἥνίκα. For the termination cp. αὐτίκα.

πρώ] The Attic form of πρωί, 'mane.' πρῶ is read here in spite of the MSS., which give πρωί. In Aristophanes it always scans as a monosyllable. Cp. Prot. 311 A, πρὸ γὰρ ἐστίν.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν] 'Yes, very.' In πάνυ μὲν οὖν, as in μὲν οὖν generally, there is no need of a counterbalancing δέ. It has often been remarked that μέν and δέ are weaker forms of μήν and δή.

Πηνίκα μάλιστα;] 'About what o'clock is it?'

Ὀρθρος βαθύς] 'Early dawn.' Ὀρθρος is the time before sunrise.

Cp. Laws 951 D, ἀπ' ὄρθρου μέχρι περ ἂν ἥλιος ἀνάσχη: Prot. 310 A, τῆς παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι βαθέος ὄρθρου: St. Luke xxiv. 1, τῇ δὲ μὲ τῶν σαββάτων, ὄρθρου βαθέος.

Θαυμάζω ὅπως κ.τ.λ.] Socrates is surprised at the early hour at which Crito had contrived to obtain admission. On previous occasions Socrates' friends had been kept waiting for some time until the prison was opened—ἀνεψύγετο γὰρ οὐ πρῶ (Phaedo 59 D).

ὑπακούσαι] Cp. Phaedo 59 E, ὁ θυρωρός, ὅσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν. ὑπακούειν is to hear and obey or answer. For the former sense cp. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. X. 9, § 10, ὡς ὑπακουσομένων τῶν ἐπικικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων, 'under the idea that those who have been trained in virtuous habits will lend a willing ear'; for the latter cp. Soph. 217 D, πάντες γὰρ ὑπακούσονται σοι πράως, said of a number of youths all of whom were ready to act as respondents in dialectic. 'Auscultare' in Latin, with its French equivalent 'écouter,' and our own word 'hearken,' have occasionally the same double meaning.

τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται] What we should express by the word 'tip.' The same idea is conveyed still more delicately in Aristophanes, Clouds 1147, χρῆ γὰρ ἐπιθαυμάζειν τι τὸν διδάσκαλον. For the omission of the augment, required by the perf. in place of reduplication, cp. Rep. 615 B, εὐεργετηκότες. The augment proper is commonly omitted by Xenophon, e. g. Ages. IV. § 4, εὐεργέτει, Apol. § 26, εὐεργέτουν (Dindorf). The augmenting of the syllable εὐ-, however, is a point on which there is much diversity both among MSS. and editors.

ἐπικικῶς] The Scholiast notes this as a favourite word with Plato. The combination ἐπικικῶς πάλαι recurs in Theaet. 142 A.

εἴτα] Used just like our 'then,' to indicate surprise. Cp. Meno B 71 C, Εἴτα οὐκ ἐδόκει σοι εἰδέναι;

μὰ τὸν Δί'] For the use of the article cp. Meno 82 A, οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία: 98 B, νή τὸν Δία. More often the article is omitted, as in Apol. 17 B, 26 D, E, Meno 83 B. νή marks an affirmative, μὰ a negative oath, except where ναί precedes it, in which case the oath is strongly affirmative, as ναὶ μὰ Δία.

οὐδ' ἂν αὐτός κ.τ.λ.] 'I could wish that I myself were not thus awake and in sorrow.'

ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε κ.τ.λ.] For ἐν τοσαύτῃ ἀγρυπνία τε καὶ λύπη. This displacement of the conjunction becomes intelligible, if we supply τοσαύτῃ again before λύπη, so that the full expression would be ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνία καὶ τοσαύτῃ λύπη. So in Phaedo 94 D, τὰ τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἱατρικὴν = τὰ τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἱατρικὴν.—Stallbaum.

σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω] 'Jamdudum te miror.' For θαυμάζειν with the gen. cp. 50 C, εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζοιμεν λεγόντων.

διάγοις] Sc. τὸν χρόνον. διάγοις is Hirschig's emendation for διάγης, which is read by Hermann and Schanz. διάγης is intelligible if we suppose Crito to contemplate the possibility of Socrates resuming his sleep.

τοῦ τρόπου] 'In your turn of mind.' Cp. Phaedo 58 E, εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο, ᾧ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων.

πλημμελής] πλημμελής (perhaps from παρὰ and μέλος) is the opposite of ἐμμελής. Here render 'a stupidity.'

τηλικούτων ὄντα] 'At such an age.' Socrates was now 70. See 52 E and Apol. 17 D. The words agree with τινα, which is latent in ἀγανακτεῖν as its subject. This suppression of the subj. of an infin. is common enough. Cp. Apol. 29 A, δοκεῖν σόφον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα.

τηλικούτος is sometimes used without distinction of person, as here and in Parm. 136 D. But as a rule τηλικόσδε belongs to the 1st person and τηλικούτος to the 2nd. As instances of τηλικόσδε used by the speaker of himself, either alone or along with others, take 49 A ad fin., Apol. 34 E, 37 D, Theaet. 377 D, Parm. 136 D, Laws 634 D; and as instances of τηλικούτος used of the person spoken to take Prot. 361 E, Gorg. 466 A, 489 B, Menex. 234 B.

C ἡ ἡλικία] Here = 'senectus.' But the word means simply 'time of life' (as in Polit. 270 D, ἣν ἡλικίαν ἕκαστον εἶχε τῶν ζώων: cp. Meno 72 A), so that it has sometimes to be rendered 'youth,' e. g. Arist. E. N. I. 9, § 10, sometimes 'manhood,' Lysis 209 A, and sometimes, as here and in Lach. 180 D, 'old age.' From 'age' ἡλικία comes to mean 'appearance of age,' Euthyd. 271 B, Demosth. 1024 ad fin., and so easily passes into the sense of 'stature,' which it bears in the N. T. (Mat. vi. 27, Luke xii. 25, xix. 3) and perhaps in Hdt. III. 16.

τὸ μὴ οὐχί] When a verb denoting 'hindrance or freedom from anything' is itself negated, as here (οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται, 'does not at all release them from'), the double negative μὴ οὐ is generally used rather than the simple μὴ with the infinitive. See Goodwin's Greek Grammar § 263. Cp. Rep. 354 B, οὐκ ἀπεσχόμεν τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐλθεῖν. Either the simple infinitive or the infinitive with τοῦ might have been used here in place of the infinitive with τό. Cp. Meno 89 D, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐ καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

ἐπιτηδείους] Socrates disowned the title of διδάσκαλος for himself with its correlative of μαθητής for his hearers. See Apol. 33 A, ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτε ἐγενόμην, and Xen. Mem.

I. 2, § 3. Socrates declared that he investigated, but did not teach, and that whoever wished was welcome to investigate along with him. Accordingly his circle of admirers are always indicated by names implying friendship and companionship, such as ἐπιτήδευι here and in Xen. Mem. I. 1, § 6, ἐπιθυμηταί (Ibid. I. 2, § 60), ὀμιληταί (Ibid. §§ 12, 48), συνουσιασταί (I. 6, § 1), or by phrases with a like meaning, such as οἱ συνόντες αὐτῷ, οἱ συγγιγνόμενοι, οἱ συνδιατρίβοντες, οἱ ὀμιλοῦντες αὐτῷ (IV. 7, § 1), οἱ πλησιάζοντες, οἱ μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ (IV. 2, § 1), οἱ συνήθεις (IV. 8, § 2). Aristippus also, in speaking to Plato, talks of Socrates as ὁ ἐταῖρος ἡμῶν (Arist. Rhet. II. 23, § 12). Cp. Euthyd. 305 A and the close of the Phaedo, ἦδε ἡ τελευτή, ᾧ Ἑκκράτες, τοῦ ἐταίρου ἡμῶν ἐγένετο. See Grote, Hist. of Greece vol. viii. p. 212, note 3 (1884).

ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατ'] 'Will find it hardest perhaps to bear.' The old explanation of this idiom, given among others by Stallbaum, is that the sentence in full would run thus—ἐν τοῖς βαρέως φέρουσιν ἐγὼ βαρύτατα ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι. This theory is based on the supposition that τοῖς is here nothing more than the article. It is certainly not strengthened by the fact that ἐν τοῖς may be followed by a feminine adjective. Thus in Thuc. III. 81, § 6 we have ἐν τοῖς πρώτῃ ἐγένετο (ἡ στάσις) and in III. 17, § 1, ἐν τοῖς πλείστῃ δὴ νῆες, 'one of the very largest naval forces.' Probably the true explanation of the origin of the phrase is to be found in the early use of the article as a pronoun, a force which is clearly marked in Euthyd. 303 C, πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα . . . ἐν δὲ τοῖς καὶ τοῦτο. But though the same force might be thrust upon the words ἐν τοῖς both here and in other passages (e.g. 52 A below, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἀθηναίων σέ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα—'you, not the least of the Athenians, but most among them'), this force was probably not present to the mind of the user. The fact seems to be that the formula degenerated into unintelligibility, so that ἐν τοῖς came to be a mere adverbial expression whereby any superlative, whether adjective or adverb, might be softened. Hence it was prefixed equally whether the adjective were masculine or feminine. Thus ἐν τοῖς ἀρίστον (Meno 93 E) means 'one of the best,' ἐν τοῖς πρώτον (Phil. 53 A), 'among the first,' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα (52 A and Theaet. 186 A), 'perhaps the most.' So here Crito, instead of claiming a supremacy of woe, softens down βαρύτατα into ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατα, out of respect for the other friends of Socrates. Cp. Thuc. VII. 71, § 4, ἐν τοῖς χαλεπώτατα διηγόν, 'fared among the worst.' The fact that a more regular expression is sometimes found, in which ἐν τοῖς agrees with the adjective following, is only an instance of the reaction of language against the unintelligible. Thus in Charm.

181 B we have καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡγοῦ με ἐν τοῖς εὐνουστάτοις σοι εἶναι and in Euthyd. 305 A, καὶ οὗτοι, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ἐν τοῖς κρατίστοις εἰσὶ τῶν νῦν.

Τίνα ταύτην] Supply φέρεις. We have here one of the many varieties of attraction. In its full logical completeness the sentence would be Τίς ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ ἀγγελία, ἣν ἀγγελίαν φέρεις; The interrogative and demonstrative are accommodated to the case of the relative, and all but they omitted.

τὸ πλοῖον] It is explained in the Phaedo (58 A-C) that, according to Athenian tradition, this was the very ship in which Theseus sailed to Crete with the seven youths and seven maidens whom he rescued from the Minotaur. The Athenians had made a vow to Apollo that, if these victims were saved, they would send every year a sacred embassy to the island of Delos. During the time of this θεωρία, which was reckoned from the moment when the priest of Apollo crowned the stern of the vessel until its return to Athens, the city was kept pure from pollution, and no public executions were allowed. This time might be long or short according to the state of wind and weather. Now it happened that the ceremony of crowning had taken place the day before the trial of Socrates. Hence the philosopher was kept in prison until the return of the vessel, which in this instance was unusually delayed owing to its being the time of the quinquennial festival of Apollo at Delos. Xenophon (Mem. IV. 8, § 2) tells us that thirty days intervened between the trial and death of Socrates.

D τεθνάναι] Cp. Apol. 39 E, οἱ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι: 30 C, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι. In all these passages we might have expected ἀποθανεῖν or ἀποθνήσκειν (cp. Phaedo 67 E), since the strict meaning of τεθνάναι is, not 'to die,' but 'to be dead.' Cp. Phaedo 64 C, where the word is defined, and Gorg. 493 A, ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθναμεν, 'that in our present state we are dead' (Cope). In Apol. 40 C τεθνάναι admits of being taken in its strict sense of the state which supervenes upon the act of dying—καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅσοι οἴομεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. This sense is clearly marked in Phaedo 71 C-E, where it is laid down that τὸ τεθνάναι is the state which is the opposite of τὸ ζῆν, as sleeping is the opposite of waking. Τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν, we are there told, is the proper word to express the transition from τὸ ζῆν to τὸ τεθνάναι, just as τὸ καταδαρθάνειν expresses the transition from τὸ ἐγρηγορεῖν (waking) to τὸ καθεύδειν.

δοκεῖ μὲν] 'I think (though I would not venture to affirm).' After a negative ἀλλὰ . . . μὲν is used without δέ following. The force of the μὲν in such cases would be represented in English only

by the stress of the voice. Cp. Meno 87 A, οὐπω οἶδα εἰ ἔστι τοῦτο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ μὲν τινα ὑπόθεσιν, 'I don't know, but as an hypothesis.' Stallbaum has collected the following other instances of this usage—Theaet. 201 B, Soph. 240 B, Phaedrus 242 C, Prot. 344 A, Rep. 475 E, of which it will be sufficient to quote the last—Οὐδαμῶς, εἶπον, ἀλλ' ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις, where the suppressed clause with δέ is supplied by the next question—Τοὺς δὲ ἀληθινοὺς, ἔφη, τίνας, λέγεις;

Schanz here reads δοκεῖν μὲν μοι ἥξει. The Scholiast R notes δοκεῖν as an alternative reading for δοκεῖ. For this absolute use of the infinitive we may compare Meno 81 A, Ἀληθῆ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν, καὶ καλόν: also the common phrases ἔκων εἶναι, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ὀλίγου δεῖν (Apol. 22 A).

Σουνίου] A promontory forming the south-east corner of the Athenian territory. A ship would pass it on coming from Delos.

[τῶν ἀγγέλων] These words are suspected of being a gloss or explanatory comment which has crept into the text. If they are omitted, ἐκ τούτων will naturally be taken as neuter, referring to ἐξ ὧν. There seems however to be no good reason to doubt their genuineness.

εἰς αὔριον] 'On the morrow.' Cp. Il. VIII. 538, ἡελίου ἀνιόντος ἐς αὔριον: Xen. Anab. III. 1, § 3, εἰς τὴν ἐσπέραν σιτοῦ γεγύσαντο. In Hellenistic Greek this use of εἰς became common.

τύχη ἀγαθῇ] 'Good luck attend it.' Lat. 'quod bene vortat' or 'quod bonum felix faustumque sit.' Cp. Phil. 57 E, Symp. 177 E, Laws 625 C, ἀλλ' ἴωμεν ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ. The formula is appropriate to occasions of solemnity. Thus in the terms of the truce between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians we read Δάχης εἶπε (moved) τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ τῇ Ἀθηναίων, ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐκχειρίαν (Thuc. IV. 118, § 7).

εἰ ταύτῃ κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Mat. xxvi. 42, γενηθήτω τὸ θέλημά σου, and see note on 54 E.

ἡ ἦ] In full ἡ ἐκείνη ἡ ἡμέρα ἦ. The ἦ is due to the comparative force in ὑστεραίᾳ. So in Symp. 173 A Schanz reads τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἡ τὰ ἐπινίκια ἔθυσεν. 44 A

οἱ τούτων κύριοι] I. e. οἱ ἔνδεκα or οἱ ἄρχοντες, as they are called in Apol. 39 E.

τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας] 'On the day now coming on.' So in 46 A below, τῆς ἐπιούσης νυκτός. Cp. the adj. ἐπιούσιος, which occurs only in two passages of the N. T., Matthew vi. 11 and Luke xi. 3, τὸν ἄρτον τὸν ἐπιούσιον, 'bread for the coming day.'

ὀλίγον πρότερον] 'A little while ago,' and so after midnight, at the time when dreams are true. Hor. Sat. I, 10, 33,
post mediam noctem visus cum somnia vera.

Cp. Moschus, Idyll II. 2, 5,

νυκτὸς ὅτε τρίτατον λάχος ἴσταιται, ἐγγύθι δ' ἥως.

εὔτε καὶ ἀτρεκέων ποιμαίνεται ἔθνος ὀνείρων.

ταύτης τῆς νυκτός] Gen. of time within which.

κινδυνεύεις] 'It may be that you'—a favourite mode of expression with Plato.

Λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα] Like Ἀρετή in the choice of Herakles, who is described as ἐσθῆτι λευκῇ (Xen. Mem. II. 1, § 22).

Ἡματί κεν κ.τ.λ.] 'Three days hence shalt thou come to the deep-soiled land of Phthiotis.' Adapted from Homer Il. IX. 363, where Achilles speaks of going home—

ἥματί κε τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἱκοίμην.

Even so the vision speaks to Socrates of going home. Cicero (De Div. I. § 52) translates the line thus—

'Tertia te Phthiae tempestas laeta locabit.'

This incident of the dream, like that of the proposal to escape from prison (see note on C, ἡμῶν προθυμονύμενων) is connected by Diogenes Laertius (II. § 35) with Aeschines instead of Crito—
Ὅναρ δόξας τινὰ αὐτῷ λέγειν,

ἥματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἱκοιο,

πρὸς Αἰσχίνην ἔφη, Εἰς τρίτην ἀποθανοῦμαι.

Ἐναργές μὲν οὖν] 'Nay, its meaning is plain.' The force of the particles μὲν οὖν is corrective, like that of 'immo vero' in Latin. For ἐναργές cp. Hom. Od. IV. 841,

φίλον δέ οἱ ἦτορ ἰάνθη,

ὥς οἱ ἐναργές ὄνειρον ἐπέσσυτο νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ.

ὦ δαιμόνιε] A frequent form of address in Plato, indicative of astonishment, real or assumed (cp. its use in Meno 92 C). Perhaps we may render it here 'you strange being.' The copiousness of the Greek language and the dramatic versatility of Plato supply him with suitable forms of address for every shade of feeling. Thus we have in different places ὦ γαθέ, ὦ ἀριστε or ὠριστε, ὦ βέλτιστε, ὦ λῶστε, ὦ μακάριε, ὦ θεϊε, ὦ φίλε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ὦ τᾶν, ὦ ξένε, ὦ γενναῖε, ὦ γεννάδα, ὦ θαυμαστέ, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὦ πάντων ἀνδρεῖότατε, ὦ μαρῆ, ὦ καταγέλαστε.

τοῦ ἑστερησθαι] τοῦ is a correction by the editors for the σοῦ of the MSS. Hermann retains σοῦ and defends the omission of τοῦ by examples, e.g. Hdt. I. 210, ἀντὶ δὲ ἀρχεσθαι ὑπ' ἄλλων ἀρχεῖν ἀπάντων.

οὐδένα μή ποτε εὐρήσω] Aorist subjunctive. Cp. Apol. 29 D, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι : Phil. 15 D, καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ παύσῃται ποτε οὔτε ἤρξατο νῦν : Rep. 492 E, οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται οὔτε γέγονεν οὐδὲ οὖν μὴ γένηται. It is generally an aorist subjunctive that is used with οὐ μή, but not always, e.g. Rep. 341 C, ἀλλ' οὐ μὴ οἷός τ' ᾔς. Instances with οὐδεῖς, such as we have here, are not nearly so common as those with οὐ, οὔτε, or οὐδέ. We have one in Charm. 168 E, ἄχρων γὰρ ὄψις οὐδὲν μὴ ποτε ἴδῃ, 'the eye cannot possibly see that which is destitute of colour.' This form of expression conveys an emphatic denial. As to its origin different views are taken. On the one hand there is the explanation given by Goodwin (Greek Grammar § 257) that the double negative is merely for emphasis, and that the subjunctive is a relic of the old Homeric usage, in which it is equivalent to a future, as in Il. I. 262,

οὐ γάρ πω τοίους ἴδον ἀνέρας, οὐδὲ ἴδωμαι.

On the other hand there is the hypothesis that the expression originated in an ellipse of some such word as δεινόν. There is a good deal to be said for the latter view, inasmuch as we find passages in which the expression occurs in full, e.g. Apol. 28 B, οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ : Phaedo 84 B, οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ : Gorg. 520 D, οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῷ μήποτε ἀδικηθῇ.

ἔτι δέ] This is the most perplexing δέ in Plato, and it is a comfort to find that Schanz has eliminated it, reading ἔτι δῆ. With this reading we may add the χωρίς μέν preceding to the cases of οὐ . . . ἀλλὰ . . . μέν collected by Stallbaum. See note on 43 D above, δοκεῖ μέν. The peculiar awkwardness of this δέ lies in the fact that we have here μέν and δέ in one and the same sentence.

ὥς οἷός τ' ὦν] Apparently ὥς coalesces with οἷός τ' ὦν. Otherwise C we would have a violent change of constr. in ἀμελήσαι, since the ὥς preceding would have prepared us for the finite form ἡμέλησα here.

ἢ δοκεῖν] The comparative particle ἢ merely serves to carry out the force of the genitive of comparison (ταύτης), which precedes it. So in Gorg. 500 C we have οὐ, 'than which,' reinforced by ἢ τοῦτο.

ἡμῶν προθυμουμένων] According to Idomeneus, quoted by Diogenes Laertius (II. § 60 and III. § 36) the advice to escape from prison was really tendered to Socrates by Aeschines (the Socratic), whose name Plato suppressed out of enmity. Idomeneus (about B.C. 310-270) was a disciple of Epicurus, and the author of a work entitled περὶ τῶν Σωκρατικῶν (D. L. II. § 20).

ἐπιεικέστατοι] ἐπιεικεία is justice tempered with mercy. The

judgment of the *ἐπιεικέις* therefore would be at once wise and charitable.

αὐτά] ‘The facts.’ This vague use of the pronoun without any distinct antecedent is more common in the singular than in the plural. For the pl. cp. 46 C; Prot. 329 B, *ὡς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ*, ‘as the facts prove.’

ἀν πραχθῇ] ‘That the facts have occurred in the way they have.’ We should have a fut. perf. here in Latin.

D δῆλα . . . ὅτι] ‘Show that,’ lit. ‘are evident that’—a construction of the same type as *δίκαιός εἰμι* (see 45 A, *δίκαιοι ἔσμεν*). It is more common with living subjects, e. g. Gorg. 448 D, *δῆλος γάρ μοι Πῶλος . . . ὅτι . . . μεμελέτηκεν*.

ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ᾗ] ‘Has been misrepresented to them.’

Εἰ γὰρ ὥφελον] The formula *εἰ ὥφελον* or *εἴθ’ ὥφελον* expresses a regret, or a wish that is not expected to be realised. *Εἰ* by itself is intelligible in expressing a wish, if we suppose the apodosis to be suppressed; *ὥφελον* is also intelligible in expressing a regret: but the combination of the two could only arise after the original force of each had been lost.

ἵνα οἰοί τε ἦσαν] ‘So that they might have been able.’ We have *ἵνα* with the indicative, when a purpose is made to depend upon some unfulfilled condition, or, as here, some unaccomplished wish. Other instances of this use of *ἵνα* in Plato are Theaet. 161 C, Symp. 181 E, Euthyd. 304 E, Prot. 335 C, Meno 89 B, *ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν*. *ὅπως* is used in the same way in Rep. 378 A, *ὅπως ὅτι ἐλαχίστοις συνέβη ἀκοῦσαι*. The same construction with *ὡς* occurs in the Tragedians, e. g. Soph. Oed. T. 1392; Eur. Hipp. 930, 1079,

*εἴθ’ ἦν ἔμavτὸν προσβλέπειν ἐναντίον
στάνθ’, ὡς ἐδάκρυσ’ οἷα πάσχομεν κακά—*

and is common in Lysias.

ἀγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα] A rhetorical inversion with a view to the chiasmus—

*τὰ μέγιστα κακά
ἀγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα.*

οὐδέτερα οἰοί τε] An accusative is found in the same way after *δυνατός* and *ἀδύνατος*. Polit. 295 B, *ἐπεὶ τοῦτ’ ἂν δυνατὸς ᾖν*; Hip. Min. 367 E, *δυνατώτατός γε ἀμφοτέρα*; Prot. 335 C, *ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος*; Meno 94 B, *ἀδυνάτους γεγονέναι τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα*.

φρόνιμον] *φρόνησις*, according to Socrates, was the only unconditional good. All other things were good or bad according as

they were directed by *φρόνησις* or not. See Meno 88 B, C. Cp. the concluding words of Cebetis Tabula, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν μόνον ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀφρονεῖν κακόν, and the statement of Diogenes Laertius (II. § 31) with respect to Socrates, Ἐλεγε δὲ καὶ ἐν μόνον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὴν ἐπιστήμην· καὶ ἐν μόνον κακόν, τὴν ἀμαθίαν.

ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσιν] ‘As they may,’ and so often, as here, ‘anyhow,’ ‘at random.’ In 45 D below we have the same phrase again, ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράξουσιν, ‘they will fare as they may.’ Cp. Symp. 181 B; Prot. 353 B; Gorg. 522 C; Arist. E. N. IV. 3, § 21, αὐτοὶ δ’ ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι πράττουσι, ‘they themselves act anyhow.’

Ταῦτα . . . τάδε] Since ὅδε is properly the demonstrative of the 1st person and οὗτος of the 2nd, it follows that ὅδε with its derivatives is naturally used in introducing a speech or idea, while οὗτος with its derivatives is used in referring to what has already been mentioned: for what a speaker has said is already in possession of his hearer; whereas what he is going to say can be known only to himself. Cp. Apol. 37 A, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὧ Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον (as you imagine), ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε (as I will tell you) μᾶλλον: Meno 90 C ad fin., ἄρ’ ὕταν τοῦτο λέγωμεν, τόδε λέγομεν.

ἄρα γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεῖ] ‘You are not concerned for me: are you?’ The particles indicate a suspicion that Socrates is thus concerned.

οἱ συκοφάνται] It is a hard saying in Liddell and Scott that ‘συκοφάντης in the sense of an informer never occurs.’ In Aristoph. Acharn. 820 the συκοφάντης comes on the stage saying

τὰ χοιρίδια τοίνυν ἐγὼ φανῶ ταδὶ
πολέμια καὶ σέ.

‘Then I’ll inform against these porkers as contraband of war, and against you too.’ He ends by getting exported as an article which they had too much of at Athens.

The word was derived by the ancients from *συκον* and *φαίνω*, the story being that there was a law at Athens against the exportation of figs, and that those who brought instances of its violation under the notice of the Archons received the name of *συκοφάνται*. This derivation is given by Athenaeus (74 e, f) on the authority of two writers, and Plutarch (Solon, ch. xxiv) does not think it improbable. It is certain that under the constitution of Solon the laws against exportation were very strict. Whatever the origin of the word may have been, it came to be used of anyone who made a trade of accusing.

πράγματα παρέχωσιν] Crito spoke from experience. He had suffered so much from these gentry himself that at last, by the advice of Socrates, he protected himself by engaging the services of a poor but honest man, named Archdemus, who made it his

business to acquaint himself with the misdeeds of the sycophants, and render the game of law less attractive to them (Xen. Mem. II. 9).

45 A ἔασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν] 'Bid good-bye to it.' A common phrase. Cp. Phil. 59 C, Euthyd. 307 B, &c. It recurs in 46 D. Cp. 'valere jubeo' in Latin.

δίκαιοί ἐσμεν] We have already had instances in κινδυνεύεις (44 A) and in δῆλα . . . ὅτι (44 D) of the preference of Greek for a personal where we should use an impersonal construction. The idiom is specially frequent with this word δίκαιος, e.g. Apol. 18 A, δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι: Crat. 428 A and Gorg. 461 D, δίκαιός δ' εἶ: Meno 85 E, δίκαιος γάρ πον εἶ εἰδέναι: Menex. 246 C, δίκαιός εἰμι εἰπεῖν. The employment of the neut. pl. is rarer, as in Menex. 237 D, δίκαια ἐπαινεῖσθαι. δῆλος is used in the same way, e.g. Euthyphro 14 B, δῆλος εἶ; and words like δῆλος, such as φανερός, καταφανής, Rep. 506 B, καλῶς ἦσθα καὶ πάλαι καταφανής ὅτι κ.τ.λ., κατάδηλος, 46 D, Prot. 342 B. ἀναγκαῖος also is found similarly constructed in a few passages—Soph. 242 B; Gorg. 449 C; Laws 643 C. Cp. the use of numerals in -αῖος, like τριταῖος.

κινδυνεύειν . . . κίνδυνον] A cognate accusative seldom merely repeats the verb. There is generally some increase of definiteness, such as that which is furnished here by the demonstrative and the article, or by the article alone, as in Gorg. 483 C, τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ τοὺς ψόγους ψέγουσι, 'they praise, when they praise, and they blame, when they blame'; Theaet. 169 B, σὺ δὲ κατ' Ἀνταῖον τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ δρᾶμα δρᾶν, 'but you seem to me to act, in what you are doing, more after the fashion of Antaeus.'

μὴ ἄλλως ποίει] 'Do not say me nay.' A common phrase in Plato to mark an earnest request. The formula is repeated below (46 A), at the end of Crito's speech, in a more emphatic form. There, as here, it follows πείθου, after which it is a pleonasm: but it has a tendency to be used in this superfluous way. Cp. Phaedo 117 A, ἀλλ' ἴθι, ἔφη, πιθοῦ καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει: Parm. 136 E, δεῖσθαι τοῦ Παρμενίδου . . . ἐνδείξασθαι ὃ λέγοι καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν, 'they begged Parmenides to give them an illustration of what he spoke of, and not to refuse them their request'; Rep. 328 B, ἀλλὰ μένετε καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖτε: cp. 338 A (twice), 369 B.

Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθεύμαι κ.τ.λ.] 'I am concerned both for that and for many other things.' This is an answer to the question above, which began with the words ἀρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεῖ.

Μῆτε τοίνυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ] This is resumed below at ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, μῆτε ταῦτα κ.τ.λ., where the counterbalancing clause with μῆτε is supplied.

δ . . . λαβόντες] 'For which.'

ὥς εὐτελεῖς] Supply εἰσί. The words καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν δέοι depend also on ὥς, 'how cheap these informers are, and how there would be no need of much money to spend upon them.'

ἱκανά] Crito was able to leave his son Critobulus a very wealthy B man, as we gather from the Oeconomicus of Xenophon.

καὶ . . . κηδόμενος] 'Even if, out of regard for me.'

ξένοι οὗτοι ἐνθάδε] 'There are the strangers whom you know of here' (i. e. in Athens).

ἔτοιμοι] ἔτοιμος, like φροῦδος, is commonly used without ἐστί.

Σιμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος] A friend and compatriot of Cebes. They had both studied under Philolaus the Pythagorean before joining Socrates (Phaedo 61 D), but were still young at the time of Socrates' death (Ib. 89 A). In the Phaedrus (242 B) Socrates is made to speak of him as beyond all comparison the most eager disputant of his day. He and Cebes support the principal parts, next to Socrates, in the dialogue of the Phaedo; and the famous analogy of the soul to a harmony is there put into the mouth of Simmias (85 E-86 D). He was the author of a book containing twenty-three dialogues, the titles of which may be read in Diogenes Laertius (II. § 124).

Κέβης] Cebes, like his friend Simmias, was drawn from Thebes to Athens by the magic of Socrates (Xen. Mem. III. 11, § 17; cp. I. 2, § 48). According to Aulus Gellius (II. 18, copied by Macrobius, Sat. I. 11) and Lactantius (III. 24 ad fin.) it was Cebes who, at the suggestion of Socrates, rescued Phaedo from a state of slavery, though Diogenes Laertius (II. §§ 31, 105) is inclined to assign this honour to Crito. Only three dialogues are ascribed to him—the Πίναξ, 'Εβδόμη and Φρόνιχος (D. L. II. § 125). But if he was a less voluminous author than his friend Simmias, he was a much more successful one. For the first of these, the Πίναξ or Tabula Cebetis, has been one of the books of all time. It is a sort of classical anticipation of the Pilgrim's Progress. The style is the purest Attic, however much Cebes in moments of excitement may have been liable to break into his native Boeotian (Phaedo 62 A, Ἴττω Ζεύς. Cp. Aristoph. Acharn. 860). Cebes is described by his friend Simmias in the Phaedo as being the most difficult of men to convince (καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις). This no doubt reflects the experience of Plato himself, with whom Cebes was on intimate terms (see Letters 363 A). At all events we find the Cebetis Tabula, which internal evidence shows to have been composed late in life, written from exactly the point of view assigned to Cebes in the Phaedo—that of one who admitted with Pythagoras the

previous existence, but doubted the subsequent duration, of the soul. The Πίναξ is twice referred to by Lucian (De Mercede Conductis 42 ; Rhetorum Praeceptor 6) as the work of 'the great Cebes' (ὁ Κέβης ἐκείνος).

πολλοὶ πάνν] This position of πάνν after the adjective or adverb which it strengthens is common enough both in Plato and other authors, e.g. Apol. 21 B, μόγισ πάνν : Menex. 235 A, γενναίως πάνν : Thuc. IV. 89, § 2, φοβούμενοι . . . τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην σπουδῇ πάνν : Ceb. Tab. XV. ὀλίγοι πάνν, ἀνάβασις στενῇ πάνν.

ὅπερ λέγω] 'As I say.'

ἀποκάμης σαυτὸν σῶσαι] Crito tries to represent the refusal to fly as due merely to want of energy.

ὃ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ] Apol. 37 D. There is nothing corresponding to this in the Apology of Xenophon.

ὃ τι χρῆσθαι σου] A common phrase in Attic Greek. Cp. Xen. Anab. III. 1, § 40, ὥσθ' οὕτω γ' ἐχόντων, οὐκ οἶδ' ὃ τι ἂν τις χρήσται αὐτοῖς.

C ἄλλοσε] For ἄλλοθι by attraction to ὅποι following.

ἀγαπήσουσί σε] 'They will be glad to have you.'

εἰσὶν ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖ ξένοι] Men of wealth and position had generally friends in foreign parts, who would receive them if they came there.

Cp. Eur. Alc. 559—

αὐτὸς δ' ἀρίστου τοῦδε τυγχάνω ξένου,

ὅταν περ Ἀργούς διψίαν ἔλθω χθόνα.

σαυτὸν προδοῦναι] Explanatory of πρᾶγμα. Cp. Meno 76 A, ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτῃ πράγματα προστάττει ἀποκρίνεσθαι : 80 A, καὶ σὺ δοκεῖς μοι νῦν ἐμὲ τοιοῦτόν τι πεποιηκέναι, ναρκᾶν.

ἐξόν] An instance of a construction which might be called 'neuter absolute.' It is commonly classed under the head of 'accusative absolute.' The participles of εἰμί and its compounds are often thus used, e.g. οἶόν τε ὅν in 46 A below, ἐνόν, ἐξόν, παρόν (Eur. Alc. 284) ; so are those of impersonal verbs generally, as δέον, μέλον (Apol. 24 D), δοκοῦν (Eur. Hec. 121, 506), δόξαν, προσήκον ; less often the active participles of personal verbs, such as ἦκον (Eur. Alc. 291), τυχόν, παρατυχόν (Thuc. V. 60, § 2), παρασχόν (Ibid. § 5) ; and perhaps least often passive participles, as προσταχθέν, εἰρημένον.

ἔσπενσαν] This governs ἅπερ, like σπεύσαιεν, and is explained by σὲ διαφθεῖραι βουλόμενοι.

D οἰχήσει] Lit. 'You will be gone.' οἴχομαι, like ἦκω and ἔρρω, while pres. in form, is perf. in meaning.

τὸ σὸν μέρος] 'For your part.' So below 50 B, 54 C.

ὃ τι ἂν τύχωσι] See note on 44 D, ὃ τι ἂν τύχωσιν.

εἴωθε] Perf. of ἔθω, but itself used in a present sense, like οἶδα γέγηθα, τέθνηκα, πέφυκα, μέμνημαι, κέκλημαι, &c.

τὰ ῥαθυμότατα] 'The most easy-going course.'

φάσκοντα κ.τ.λ.] We might supply σε as subject to αἰρεῖσθαι, for the participle to agree with. But perhaps the sentiment is expressed in the third person out of politeness. The suppression of *τινα* is especially frequent after impersonal verbs and phrases, such as *χρή* above. Cp. Meno 73 A, Ἄρ' οὖν οἶόν τε εὖ διοικεῖν ἢ πόλιν ἢ οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιον, μὴ σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως διοικοῦντα;

εἴσοδος] The abstract term corresponding to εἰσιέναι or εἰσέρχεσθαι, which are used of the defendant, while εἰσάγειν is used of the plaintiff. From the defendant it is transferred to the suit. Cp. Demosthenes against Phormio (p. 912, § 18, Dindorf), Μελλούσης δὲ τῆς δίκης εἰσιέναι εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον.

εἰσῆλθες] Another reading is εἰσῆλθεν, which would keep our attention fixed on δίκη as the subject throughout. The most recent editors are agreed in accepting it.

ἔξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν] Perhaps by conciliating his accusers or perhaps by flight. Cron quotes Phaedo 115 D to show that Socrates was not in prison, but out on bail, previous to his trial, and so might have escaped had he been so minded.

ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης] The conduct of the trial. The metaphor is from a wrestling match. Cp. Apol. 34 C, ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτοῦ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος.

καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον . . . δοκεῖν] The construction here is extremely difficult. καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτί is evidently coordinate with καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος and καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν, which give in detail the parts of ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα. But instead of continuing with a construction parallel to that of the preceding clauses, ὡς ἡμᾶς διέφυγε καταγελάστως, Plato suddenly breaks off into an infinitive διαπεφευγέναι, depending upon another infinitive δοκεῖν, which repeats μὴ δόξη above. Thus the infinitive δοκεῖν is here loosely put for μὴ δόξη, as in Meno 96 E the equally troublesome infinitive διαφεύγειν seems to be loosely put for ὅτι διαφεύγει. Translate 'And that—as though to crown the absurdity of the matter—this last resource should seem to have escaped our notice, through a certain cowardice and unmanliness of ours.' These last words are a repetition and extension, after Plato's manner, of ἀνδρῖα τινὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ above.

κατάγελως] Lit. 'mockery,' 'derision.' Cp. Aristoph. Acharn. 1126—

ταῦτ' οὐ κατάγελως ἔστιν ἀνθρώποις πλατὺς :
and the pun upon the word in line 606—

τοὺς δ' ἐν Καμαρίνῃ κὰν Γέλα κὰν Καταγέλα.

46 A διαπεφευγέναι] Professor Wagner tells us to translate 'to have kept out of danger': but the prevailing meaning of the word in Plato is 'to escape notice,' like λανθάνειν. Cp. Parm. 135 D, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια: Charm. 156 E; Lach. 194 B; Meno 96 E; Hip. Maj. 294 E.

οὔτινες] 'Seeing that we' = 'quippe qui.'

εἴ τι καὶ σμικρὸν κ.τ.λ.] A rather favourite expression of Plato's. Cp. Apol. 28 B, ἀνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν: Laws 630 C, 647 A, 856 C, πᾶς δὲ ἀνὴρ, οὗ καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος. Similarly Gorg. 500 C, τις καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων ἄνθρωπος.

ἅμα τῷ κακῷ κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Eur. Rhesus 756—
κακῶς πέπρακται, καὶ τοῖς κακοῖσι πρὸς
αἰσχιστα.

βουλευού . . . βεβουλευῆσθαι] 'But form your plans, or rather, there is no longer time for forming them,—they should be formed.' For the contrast between the pres. and the perf. cp. Charm. 176 C, Οὔτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τι βουλευέσθον ποιεῖν; Οὐδέν, ἔφη ὁ Χαρμίδης, ἀλλὰ βεβουλευμένα: also Eur. Hip. 1436, 7—

μή νυν προδῶς με, τέκνον, ἀλλὰ καρτέρει.
κεκαρτέρηται τᾶμ.'

'Tis finished, my endurance.'—E. P. COLERIDGE.

ἐπιούσης νυκτός] See note on 44 A, τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας.

μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποίει] See note on 45 A, μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

B εἰ . . . εἴη] Implying that it is not. Cp. Apol. 19 E, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἶός τ' εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους.

χαλεπωτέρα] 'The more difficult to deal with,' 'dangerous.'

οὐ μόνον νῦν] In place of this Schanz has οὐ νῦν πρῶτον on the authority of an inscription, but against the MSS.

τοιούτος] Supply εἰμί—a somewhat rare ellipse. τοιούτος εἶ has to be supplied in Gorg. 487 D, καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε οἶος παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι.

τῶν ἐμῶν] Perhaps neut., like τῶν ἡμετέρων in 48 A: but more probably masc. See next note.

τῷ λόγῳ] Plato is fond of speaking of 'the argument' in a quasi-personal way. Here Socrates is made to regard it as the most influential of his friends.

C πρεσβεύω] 'Give precedence to.' Cp. Eur. Alc. 282, ἐγώ σε πρεσβεύουσα. The word may contain a reference either to the respect due to old age or to the rights of primogeniture.

βελτίῳ] Masc. sing. Supply λόγον.

οὐ μή σοι ξυγχαρήσω] See note on 44 B, οὐδένα μή ποτε εὐρήσω.

πλείω] Cognate accusative. μορμολυκεία might be supplied. See Phaedo 77 E.

μορμολύττηται] 'Scare us with bugbears.' Cp. Gorg. 473 D, Μορμολύττει αὐ, ὦ γενναῖε πῶλε, καὶ οὐκ ἐλέγχεις: Xen. Symp. IV. § 27. Μορμώ (-δος, -οῦς) or Μορμών (-όνος) = Bogey, except that it is of the feminine gender. In the Acharnians (583) the word is used of the plumed helmet of Lamachus, ἀπένεγκε μὲν μου τὴν μορμόνα. So also Peace 474.

δεσμούς . . . ἀφαιρέσεις] The use of the plural, which is foreign to the nature of an abstract noun, heightens the rhetorical effect of the expression. So in Prot. 325 C we have χρημάτων τε δημεύσεις καὶ . . . τῶν οἰκῶν ἀνατροπαί: in Laws 847 A, δεσμοῖσί τε καὶ χρημάτων ζημίας καὶ ἐκβολαῖς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως κολάζοντες: in Lach. 191 D and Laws 632 A, πενίας: in Laws 647 D, ἐν τε παιδιαῖς καὶ ἐν σπουδαῖς. Even proper names are sometimes thus used in the plural e. g. Eur. Rh. 866—

οὐκ οἶδα τοὺς σοὺς οὓς λέγεις Ὀδυσσεάς.

αὐτά] See note on 44 C, αὐτά.

Εἰ πρῶτον μὲν] The apodosis is suppressed, and there is nothing to balance the μὲν. See note on 53 B, πρῶτον μὲν.

ὅν σὺ λέγεις] Referring to 44 B, ἔτι δὴ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω and to 45 E, αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δόξῃ κ.τ.λ., in which it was implied that the opinion of society was all-important.

πότερον κ.τ.λ.] Depending on ἀναλάβοιμεν above, which has the force of πάλιν σκοπεῖσθαι. The whole passage from Πῶς οὖν ἂν above may be rendered thus—'What then is the fairest way in which we can examine the question? It would be, if we were to begin by taking up again this assertion which you make about opinions, and see whether it was rightly stated on various occasions or not, that we ought to attend to some opinions, but not to others.'

ἢ οὐ] In the second alternative of a dependent disjunctive sentence it is indifferent whether οὐ or μὴ is used. Above in 46 B we had σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς, εἴτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μὴ. In Prot. 313 A we have πολλὰ ἂν περισκέψω, εἴτ' ἐπιτρεπτέον εἴτε οὐ, followed by a similar use of οὐ in B, after which we find εἴτε χρὴ ἐπιτρέπειν σαυτὸν αὐτῷ εἴτε μὴ. Again cp. Rep. 451 D, καὶ σκοπῶμεν, εἰ ἡμῖν πρέπει ἢ οὐ with Rep. 339 A, εἰ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἢ μὴ, πειράσομαι μαθεῖν.

κατάδηλος κ.τ.λ.] See note on 45 A, δίκαιοί ἐσμεν.

ἄρα] 'After all.' Ironical. Cp. 47 E.

ἄλλως] 'Idly.'

ἐνεκα λόγου] 'For the sake of saying it,' carrying out the meaning of ἄλλως. Cp. Lach. 196 C, ἀλλ' ὀρώμεν μὴ Νικίας οἴεται

D

τι λέγειν καὶ οὐ λόγου ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγει. So in Theaet. 191 C, Θὲς δὴ μοι λόγου ἕνεκα is used in introducing an impossible supposition. Cp. Lat. 'dicis causâ,' 'for form's sake.'

εἰ] 'Whether,' as often after verbs of inquiring.

ἀλλοιότερος] A refinement on ἄλλοιος, which would have expressed the meaning.

ἑάσομεν χαίρειν] εἰ has to be supplied before these words. For the phrase see note on 45 A, ἔασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν.

οἰομένων] Mid., not pass. Cp. Euthyd. 305 C, οἶονται δ' εἶναι πάντων σοφώτατοι ἀνθρώπων.

τι λέγειν] 'To have something in what they say,' and so to speak to the point, the opposite of οὐδὲν λέγειν.

E ὅσα γε τάνθρώπεια] 'In all human probability.' The same meaning is conveyed by the expression εἰ μὴ τι δαιμόνιον εἴη in Xen. Mem. I. 3, § 5.

47 A ἀποθνήσκειν] Here we have the pres.: but μέλλω is often followed by a fut.

σε παρακροῦσι] 'Disorder your judgment.' The origin of the metaphor is doubtful. See L. and S.

τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς μὴ] Notice the curious vacillation that has occurred in the use of the negative. We began in 46 D with ταῖς δὲ οὐ, after which we had in E τὰς δὲ μὴ; then in 47 A we had οὐ twice, τὰς δ' οὐ, τῶν δ' οὐ, and now we go back to μὴ. The first of these cases is introduced by ὅτι δεῖ, the second by ὅτι δέοι, and the last three by ὅτι χρή; which shows that the mood preceding does not affect the question.

τὰ τοιαῦτα] Used here with strict propriety, since it refers to things that had been said on previous occasions. See note on 44 E, ταῦτα . . . τάδε.

γυμναζόμενος κ.τ.λ.] The art of training has never been pursued so systematically as by the Greeks. Aristotle (E. N. III. 3, § 8) speaks of its rules as being more definite than those of navigation.

τοῦτο πράττων] 'Devoting all his energies to that.' Cp. the Latin 'hoc agere'; also in Greek the curious verb τευτάζω (= ταυτάζω), 'to be engrossed with,' Phil. 56 E; Rep. 521 E; Tim. 90 B.

B ἱατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης] The ἱατρὸς and παιδοτρίβης are constantly mentioned together, as being concerned with the same thing, namely, the body, on which it was the business of the physician to bestow health and of the trainer to bestow strength and beauty. See Gorg. 452 A, B. The function of the trainer in prescribing diet overlapped that of the physician (Arist. E. N. II. 6, § 7; cp. Prot. 313 D); and the two might be combined in one person, as in that of Herodicus of Selymbria (Prot. 316 E; Rep. 406 A).

τοὺς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐκείνου] The possessive genitive is equivalent to an adjective, and so has the article repeated before it.

ἔδεστέον κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Prot. 314 A, παρακαλέσαντα τὸν ἐπαίοντα, ὅτι τε ἔδεστέον ἢ ποτέον καὶ ὅτι μή.

ἐπιστάτη καὶ ἐπαίοντι] 'Who superintends and understands the subject.' ἐπιστάτης is from ἐφίσταμαι: but Plato is fond of playing on its resemblance to ἐπίσταμαι. Cp. Apol. 20 B, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν;

ἀπειθήσας] = εἰ ἡπείθησε. 'When a participle represents the protasis, its *tense* is always that in which the verb itself would have stood in the indicative, subjunctive, or optative.' Goodwin, G. G. § 226.

ἵνα μὴ πάντα διώκωμεν] See a similar curtailment of the Socratic induction in Phil. 29 B, ἐν ἐνὶ δὲ λαβὼν περὶ πάντων νόει ταῦτόν. The induction is here reduced to an analogy between the body and the soul, for which cp. Prot. 313 A-314 B.

εἰ τίς ἐστιν ἐπαίων] 'If there is anyone who understands the matter.' The analytic form ἐστιν ἐπαίων is here much more expressive than ἐπαίει would have been. This idiom occurs three times in the Meno—82 C, 'Ἔστιν . . . ἔχων=ἔχει: 84 A, οὗ ἐστιν ἡδη βαδίζων ὅδε τοῦ ἀναμνησέσθαι, 'where he is already on the road to recollection;' 84 E, Οὐκοῦν ἐστιν αὕτη γραμμὴ . . . τέμνουσα. These resolved forms are frequently to be met with in Plato, especially in the more philosophical dialogues. They abound in the Philebus. We find them sometimes in Latin, e.g. Cic. De Div. I. § 52, 'Est apud Platonem Socrates, cum esset in custodia publica, dicens Critoni suo familiari sibi post tertium diem esse moriendum,' 'We have Socrates in Plato . . . saying.'

ἐγίγνετο] 'We found to be made.' We have here a reference to a previous statement: see 47 A ad fin.—Φέρε δὴ, πῶς αὖτὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο. In such a reference the imperfect is regularly employed. Cp. Crat. 387 C, εἵπερ καὶ τὸ λέγειν πράξις ἦν: Pol. 282 B, ἥστην: Phil. 61 D, ἦν ἡμῖν ἡδονή: Phaedrus 230 A, ἀρ' οὐ τότε ἦν τὸ δένδρον: Charm. 159 D, ἡ δὲ σωφροσύνη καλόν τι ἦν: ibid. 168 D; Lysis 218 A; Meno 88 C, ἐποίει: Rep. 490 A, ἡγείτο. ἦν in these cases is a shorthand expression for ἐφάνη ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις. Cron quotes Cicero, De Off. I. § 143, 'Itaque, quae erant prudentiae propria, suo loco dicta sunt.'

ἢ οὐδὲν ἐστι τοῦτο;] ἢ properly introduces the second member of an alternative question. But the clause with πότερον is often suppressed, so that ἢ practically becomes a direct interrogative.

Here we may imagine the full question to be—*πότερόν τι λέγω ἢ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο*;

τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ] ‘The healthy,’ what tends to health, the opposite of *τὸ νοσῶδες* below, which is that which tends to disease.

E *ἢ οὐχί* ;] ‘Is it not?’ See note on *ἢ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο* above.

ῥ . . . λωβάται] The dat. after *λωβάομαι* is extremely rare.

It occurs however in the last line of the Knights of Aristophanes—

ἴν’ ἴδωσιν αὐτόν, οἷς ἐλωβᾷθ’, οἱ ξένοι.

δίνησιν] This verb itself governs the acc., but it is here coupled with a verb governing the dat. by a looseness of construction not uncommon in Plato. Cp. Symp. 201 B, *οὐ ἐνδεής ἐστι καὶ μὴ ἔχει*: Meno 78 A, *ἐπιθυμεῖν τε τῶν κακῶν καὶ κτᾶσθαι*: Laws 639 E, *σχεδὸν . . . οὐδεμίαν ὀρθῶς γιγνομένην ἑώρακα οὐδ’ ἀκήκοα.*

ἐκεῖνο, ὃ τί ποτ’ ἐστί] What Aristotle calls *τὸ ἡγούμενον* (E. N. III. 3, § 17) and what we express by the term ‘will.’ There is nothing good or bad but a good or bad will.

48 A *Οὐκ ἄρα . . . φροντιστέον*] ‘Then, my good sir, we need not mind quite so much.’ The force of *οὐ πάννυ* is always ‘non omnino,’ ‘not quite,’ ‘not much,’ ‘hardly,’ &c., though it is often used by an ironical litotes for ‘omnino non,’ ‘not at all.’ See Appendix, note C, to Cope’s translation of the Gorgias.

τί . . . ὅ τι] This change from the direct to the indirect form of interrogative is not uncommon. Cp. Gorg. 448 E, *ἀλλ’ οὐδεὶς ἠρώτα ποῖα τις εἴη ἢ Γοργίου τέχνην, ἀλλὰ τίς καὶ ὅντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν*. Again in 500 A, *Ἄρ’ οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἐκλέξασθαι, ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἐστί καὶ ὁποῖα κακά*;

ἡμᾶς] *τί ἐροῦσιν* here follows the analogy of such constructions as *κακὰ λέγειν τινά*.

ὁ ἐπαίων] ‘The expert.’ Cp. Phaedrus 275 E; Prot. 314 A; Gorg. 500 A, where he is called *τεχνικός*. The Aristotelian equivalent for an expert generally is *ὁ εἰδώς* (E. N. II. 9, § 2; X. 9, § 17); in the sphere of morals in particular it is *ὁ σπουδαῖος* or *ὁ φρόνιμος*.

αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια] For the personification of truth cp. Apol. 39 B, *οὗτοι δ’ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν*.

πρῶτον μὲν] See note on 53 B, *πρῶτον μὲν*.

εἰσηγεί, εἰσηγούμενος] ‘You are wrong in this respect in your proposal, when you propose.’ The fullness of expression gives an air of deliberateness, and is a noticeable feature of Plato’s style. Cp. 49 D, *καὶ ὅρα, ὦ Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν, ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολογῆς*: Euthyphro 8 E, *ἀμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες*: Apol. 19 B, *διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες*: Phaedo 75 D, *καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι*:

Meno 87 D, ἐπιστήμην ἂν τιν' αὐτὸ ὑποπτεύοντες εἶναι ὀρθῶς ὑποπτεύοιμεν.

Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ] 'Well, but then,' introducing a supposed objection. So in Rep. 365 C we have an objection introduced by ἀλλὰ γάρ, φησί τις and in D by ἀλλὰ δὴ. In the combination ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ there is no more need of an answering δέ than there is in πάνν μὲν οὖν or μὲν οὖν generally.

οὗτός τε] The τε answers to the καί in the following clause—καὶ Β τόνδε. Notice how οὗτος is used of what has gone before, while ὅδε in the next clause is used of what is coming. See note on 44 E, ταῦτα . . . τάδε.

ὅμοιος εἶναι τῷ καὶ πρότερον] 'To be as sound as ever.' We may perhaps compare Prot. 333 B, τὸ δὲ πρότερον αὖ ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη κ.τ.λ. But Cron and Schanz omit the τῷ, on the authority of a quotation by Priscian, which gives a much easier reading.

οὐ τὸ ζῆν κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Apol. 28 B, Gorg. 511 B and what Aristotle (Pol. I. 9, § 16) says of the love of money, Αἷτιον δὲ ταύτης τῆς διαθέσεως τὸ σπουδάζειν περὶ τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

Τὸ δὲ εὖ] Supply ζῆν. 'And that living well is the same thing as living rightly and justly.' Cp. Gorg. 507 C. Τὸ εὖ ζῆν might be taken in the sense of ἡδέως ζῆν. See Prot. 351 B; Rep. 329 A. It is in this sense that εὖ ζῆν and εὐζωΐα are used in the Ethics of Aristotle.

ἐὰν μὲν . . . εἰ δὲ μὴ] So very frequently, e. g. Phaedo 91 C, C 114 B; Prot. 311 D, 325 D, 351 E; Laws 631 B. The more symmetrical construction of ἐὰν μὲν . . . ἐὰν δὲ μὴ is less often found, as in Lysis 217 E, Prot. 328 B. In Ceb. Tab. chs. III and XXXIX we have εἰ μὲν . . . εἰ δὲ μὴ, but in ch. XI ἐὰν μὲν . . . εἰ δὲ μὴ. Cp. 53 E below, ἂν μὴ . . . εἰ δὲ μὴ.

τὰς σκέψεις] A case of inverse attraction, that is to say of the antecedent being drawn into the case of the relative. Cp. Prot. 342 B, ἵνα μὴ κατάδηλοι ᾧσιν . . . ὥσπερ οὖς Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε τοὺς σοφιστάς.

μὴ . . . ᾗ] 'These, Crito, are really questions which concern those' &c. Μὴ . . . ᾗ has here the force of an indicative statement. It may be supposed to have acquired it through the ellipse of some such word as ὅρα or φοβοῦμαι. Cp. Laws 635 E, περὶ δὲ τηλικούτων (matters of such importance) εὐθὺς πεπιστευκέναι ῥαδίως μὴ νέων τε ᾗ μάλλον καὶ ἀνοήτων.

ταῦτα] Referring to τὰς σκέψεις, but attracted into the gender of σκέμματα following.

σκέμματα] Put for σκέψεις above, for the avoidance of monotony.

σκέμμα is properly the thing inquired into and σκέψις the act of inquiring.

ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἄν] 'Ay, and would bring them back to life again.' ἀναβιώσκεισθαι is here used transitively, like ἀναβιώσασθαι in *Phaedo* 89 C. It is generally intransitive, as in *Polit.* 271 A, 272 B, ἐκ γῆς γὰρ ἀνεβιώσκοντο πάντες. Cp. 'reviviscere' in Latin, e. g. *Cic. Pro Mil.* § 79.

It may be inferred from these words that the Athenians repented of their treatment of Socrates. *Diogenes Laertius* (II. § 43) declares that they condemned Meletus to death, and *Diodorus* (XIV. 37 ad fin.) goes so far as to say that the accusers were executed in a body. But these statements may be taken for what they are worth.

ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἰρεῖ] 'After what has been proved.' *Parm.* 141 D; *Phil.* 35 D; *Rep.* 440 B, 604 C, ὅπη ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ βέλτιστ' ἂν ἔχειν. In *Rep.* 607 B it is followed by an acc. of the person, ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἥρει. Cp. the Latin phrase 'ratio vincit' or 'evincit' *Hor. Sat. I.* 3. 115; *II.* 3. 225, 250.

μὴ οὐδέν] See note on μὴ οὐ δέη in D.

D ἐξαγόμενοι] 'Letting ourselves be brought away.' An instance of what *Riddell* (*Digest* § 88) calls the semi-middle sense of the verb. Both passive and middle tenses are so used. Cp. *Apol.* ἐθίζεσθαι, 'to let yourselves be accustomed'; *Meno* 91 C, λωβηθῆναι, 'to get himself ruined'; *Rep.* 412 C, οἵτινες ἄρξουσὶ τε καὶ ἄρξονται, 'who are to rule or let themselves be ruled.'

μὴ οὐ δέη] The construction is continued from μὴ . . . ἦ above in C, through μὴ οὐδέν κ.τ.λ. The οὐ in such cases negatives only the particular word which follows it, so that the construction is on a par with that of μὴ with the subj., and is to be explained in the same way. In *Rep.* 368 B, δέδοικα γὰρ μὴ οὐδ' ὅσιον ἦ, 'I am afraid it may be positively sinful,' we have the full expression which might be cut down to μὴ γὰρ οὐδ' ὅσιον ἦ. Instances of μὴ οὐ with the subj. abound, e. g. *Apol.* 39 A, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἦ χαλεπόν; *Phaedo* 67 B; *Symp.* 194 C; *Meno* 89 C, 94 B, E, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἦ διδακτόν; *Lysis* 635 E, μὴ οὐ τοῦτό σε . . . κωλύη. μὴ alone with the subj. is not so common in this idiomatic sense, probably because it might be mistaken for an imperative. When it does occur, it is often, as here, in combination with μὴ οὐ, which determines the sense. Thus in *Phaedo* 69 A—C we have μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὐτῇ ἦ ἢ ὀρθῇ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγῇ followed five times by ἦ with μὴ either expressed or understood. Cp. *Arist. E. N. X.* 9, § 6, ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μὴ ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἁπασιν ἰσχύη, ἀλλὰ δέη κ.τ.λ.

ὑπολογίζεσθαι] 'To take into account.' Cp. *Apol.* 28 B, D;

Gorg. 480 C ad fin., τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν διώκοντα, μὴ ὑπολογιζόμενον τὸ ἀλγεῖνόν.

παραμένοντας] 'If we stay.'

οὔτε] Supply εἰ δεῖ.

πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν] 'Rather than act unjustly.' The whole passage resembles Apol. 28 D, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

τί δρῶμεν] Deliberative conjunctive.

παῦσαι . . . λέγων] Notice the participial construction with **E** παύειν. So also in the active, Gorg. 482 A, ἀλλὰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικά, παύσον ταῦτα λέγουσαν.

ὥς ἐγὼ κ.τ.λ.] 'Since I consider it of much importance to pursue my present course of conduct with your consent, instead of against it.' The MSS. have πείσαι, which has given much trouble. πείσας is Buttmann's emendation, suggested by Ficinus' translation. Notice the gen. abs. conveyed by the single word ἄκοντος.

τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν] 'The starting-point of the inquiry.' As the starting-point of an inquiry would often be some comprehensive principle, like that which Socrates proceeds to lay down of the duty of absolute non-resistance to evil, the other meaning of the word, namely 'first principle,' would probably assert itself here in the mind of the Greek reader. Cp. Phil. 23 C, τὴν δὲ ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ (i. e. τοῦ λόγου) διευλαβεῖσθαι πειρώμεθα τιθέμενοι, and Arist. E. N. I. 7, § 23.

πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον] They now settle down to a bout at dialectic, one of the main rules of which was that the person interrogated should answer exactly the question put to him, and nothing else. If he succeeded in doing so, his answer was πρὸς λόγον; if he failed, it was οὐδὲν πρὸς λόγον. See Phil. 42 E.

ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον] The acc. of the agent after the neut. of the **49 A** verbal adjective is explained on the principle of construction according to the sense (κατὰ σύνεσιν). ἀδικητέον = δεῖ or χρὴ ἀδικεῖν, and so the acc. is used which is required by δεῖ or χρὴ with the infinitive. Cp. Polit. 280 B; Phaedrus 272 E; Gorg. 507 D, 512 D; Laws 643 A, 809 E.

πολλάκις] These discourses are reflected for us in the Gorgias, where Socrates maintains, as against Polus and Callicles, that to do wrong is a greater evil than to suffer it, and in the Republic, where the claim of injustice to be considered the natural good of man is defended first by Thrasymachus, and then for the sake of argument by Glaucon and Adeimantus.

[ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο] The hand of the glossator is justly suspected here, referring us back to the similar expression in 46 B, τοὺς δὲ λόγους, οὓς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν.

ἤ] 'Can it be that?' See note on 47 D, ἡ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο;
ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσί] 'Have been scattered to the winds.'

τηλικοῖδε] 'At our time of life.' Socrates and Crito were contemporaries. See note on Crito. On the exact meaning of τηλικοῖδε see note on 43 B, τηλικούτον ὄντα.

[γέροντες] Supposed to be a gloss on τηλικοῖδε ἄνδρες.

B ὥσπερ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν] τότε is sometimes used indefinitely, in the sense of 'previously,' 'originally,' e.g. E. N. III. 5, § 14, Τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μὴ νοσεῖν.

φάμεν ἢ οὐ;] 'Do we say "yes" or "no"?'

ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται] The poets were the fathers of philosophy (Lysis 214 A), and Archilochus had said (Archilochi Frag. CXVIII Gaisford)—

ἐν δ' ἐπίσταμαι μέγα,

τὸν κακῶς τι δρῶντα δεινοῖς ἀνταμείβεσθαι κακοῖς.

Xenophon regards Cyrus the Younger as the type of a manly character, and records his prayer that he might live long enough to requite both friends and foes (Anab. I. 9, § 11). What was the prayer of Cyrus became the boast of Sulla, who records in the epitaph which he composed for himself that none of his friends had surpassed him in well-doing nor his foes in ill-doing (Plut. Sulla 38 ad fin.). In Xen. Mem. II. 6, § 35 the words ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι νικᾶν τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιοῦντα, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς are put into the mouth of Socrates himself, though he is not committed to them as a philosophical position. The same may be said of II. 3, § 14, where δοκεῖ is used. In II. 1, § 19 we have probably the voice of the soldier Xenophon rather than of Socrates. Even in Plato himself the current morality is sometimes put into the mouth of Socrates. See Phil. 49 D, Οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἐχθρῶν κακοῖς οὐτ' ἄδικον οὔτε φθονερόν ἐστι τὸ χαιρεῖν. But these are merely *obiter dicta* which it would be misleading to press as against the express testimony of the present passage in favour of the more advanced view held by Socrates. In the first book of the Republic the philosopher is represented as combating the doctrine of the old morality maintained by Polemarchus—ὠφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἢ δικαιοσύνη, βλάπτειν δὲ τοὺς ἐχθρούς, Rep. 332 D, 335 B; cp. Meno 71 E.

C ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ φασί] This emphatic repetition is like the reiterated 'Ἠκούσατε ὅτι ἐρρέθη of the Sermon on the Mount.

οὐδ' ἂν ὀτιοῦν πάσχη] 'No matter what one may suffer.' τις is to be supplied with πάσχη, as τινα was with the infinitives ἀδικεῖν, ἀνταδικεῖν, κακουργεῖν, ἀντικακουργεῖν. See note on 45 D, φάσκοντα κ.τ.λ. The omission of τις is rendered easier by the previous suppression of τινα. Cp. Euthyd. 284 A; Meno 79 B, τὸ μετὰ μορίου

ἀρετῆς πράττειν, ὅ τι ἂν πράττῃ, 97 A. The indefinite pronoun is sometimes omitted in the same way in Latin, e.g. Cic. Lael. § 59, 'ita amare oportere, ut si aliquando esset osurus.'

ὄρα . . . ὅπως μή] Here we have the full expression, which may occur elliptically as ὅπως μή, e.g. Charm. 157 B, ὅπως . . . μηδεὶς σε πείσῃ.

καὶ . . . καί] 'Either . . . or.'

οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή] 'Cannot take counsel together,' 'have no common ground for discussion.'

ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν] This mutual contempt of the man of the world and the philosopher is finely brought out in the Gorgias, in the attitude towards one another of Callicles and Socrates. See also Euthyd. 304 E.

ἀρχώμεθα] 'Whether we are to start from this principle in our deliberations.' The deliberative conjunctive is retained unchanged in the oblique narration after a primary tense or the imperative. Cp. Phaedo 115 C ad fin., καὶ ἐρωτᾷ δὴ, πῶς με θάπτῃ; Meno 92 E, εἰπὲ παρὰ τίνος ἔλθῃ Ἀθηναίων.

ὥς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος] These words may be rendered as though instead of ἔχοντος we had ἔχει, 'that it is never right.' They are explanatory of ἐντεῦθεν. Cp. Phil. 16 C; Meno 95 E; Rep. 437 A, ὑποθέμενοι ὡς τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος, 'on the assumption that this is so'; Laws 624 A, 626 E, 644 B, συνεχωρήσαμεν ὡς ἀγαθῶν μὲν ὄντων τῶν δυναμένων ἄρχειν αὐτῶν, κακῶν δὲ τῶν μή; Xen. Anab. II. 1, § 21, ἥ ὡς πολέμου ὄντος παρ' ὑμῶν ἀπαγγελῶ;

οὔτε . . . ἀμύνεσθαι] The dropping of the article is perhaps due to the fact that this clause, though formally on a level with the other two, is really only an enlargement of the second.

τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο] This means the next step in the argument. It is naturally a common phrase in Plato. We have it for instance in Euthyphro 12 D; Crat. 391 B; Prot. 355 A; Gorg. 462 D. Variations on it are τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα, Phil. 34 C; τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, Gorg. 512 E, Meno 27 B; τοῦπὶ τῷδε, Laws 641 A; τὸ ἐφεξῆς τούτοις, Phil. 34 D. Cp. Xen. Mem. I. 2, § 27, Οὐκοῦν, ἐφῇ ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων τούτοις (ἀπέχεσθαι δεήσεις), τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ὀσίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων;

ἀλλὰ λέγε] 'Only say on.' Sometimes we have λέγε μόνον from the respondent, sometimes λέγεις ἄν.

ἐξαπατητέον] Supply αὐτόν. ἄ is directly governed only by ποιητέον.

Ἐκ τούτων δὴ] 'As a consequence of this then.' Cp. Phil. 48 C, Ἐκ δὴ τούτων ἰδὲ τὸ γελοῖον ἥντινα φύσιν ἔχει; Meno 76 D, ἐκ τούτων δὴ ξύνες ὅ τοι λέγω.

μὴ πείσαντες] *μή* is used because the whole sentence is hypothetical—‘If we go away from here without having obtained the consent of the city.’

50 A καὶ ταῦτα] ‘And that too.’

δικαίοις οὖσιν] Put by attraction for *δικαίοις εἶναι*, which itself arises out of *τούτοις ἃ ὠμολογήσαμεν δίκαια εἶναι*. Here the process of attraction is carried one step farther than usual.

οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ] ‘For I do not grasp your meaning.’

ἀποδιδράσκειν] A word of contemptuous signification, being suggestive of the *δραπέτης*. Hence it is followed by a sort of apology for its use.

ἐλθόντες . . . ἐπιστάντες] The superposition of participles is a noticeable feature in Plato’s style. Thus in the *Apology* we have *ξυντιθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ*, 27 A; *ἀχθόμενοι . . . κρούσαντες: ἐξελθόντι . . . ἀμειβομένῳ*, 37 D.

τὸ κοινόν] ‘The commonwealth.’ The word was translated into Latin by ‘commune’ (‘commune Milyadum,’ *Cic. Verr. II. 1, § 95*; ‘commune Siciliae,’ *II. 2, §§ 144, 145, 154*), whence the French ‘commune.’ Stallbaum suggests that Cicero had the *Crito* in his mind when he composed the passage beginning ‘Nunc te patria, quae communis est parens omnium nostrum’ in his first oration against *Catiline* (§ 17).

Εἰπέ μοι] ‘The Laws speak in the singular, as a tragic chorus does by its choragus. Perhaps also τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως partly suggests the singular.’ Purves.

ἄλλο τι ἢ . . . διανοεῖ] ‘Are you not meaning?’ lit. ‘Is it anything else than that you are meaning?’ ἄλλο τι ἢ, which is often cut down to ἄλλο τι, is a common interrogatory formula in Plato. There is an avoidance of bluntness about it characteristic of the polite Hellenic mind. To exhaust the negative is an indirect way of establishing the corresponding affirmative, so that the question practically amounts to the assertion ‘You are meaning.’ Cp. *Phaedo* 79 B; *Theaet.* 165 E; *Charm.* 173 A, B; *Meno* 82 C, D, 97 A; *Rep.* 337 C.

B ἔτι . . . ἀνατετράφθαι] ‘To exist any longer and not be overturned.’ The perfect indicates the immediate and necessary consequence of lawlessness.

ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ] ‘Especially an orator.’ For the opinion which Socrates, or Plato, entertained of orators cp. *Apol.* 17 A, B; *Prot.* 329 A. He is called by Timon in the *Silli ῥητορόμυκτος* (‘rhetorician-mocker,’ *L. and S.*). See *D. L. II. § 20*.

ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου] ‘On behalf of this law whose life is threatened.’ It is said that no law could be abrogated

at Athens without its cause having been pleaded by practised advocates.

ὅτι] Notice that ὅτι is used with the direct as well as with the oblique narration, unlike 'that' in English, which is confined to the latter. Cp. Apol. 21 C, καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι οὐτοσί ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ' ἐμὲ ἔφησθα.

Ἡδίκηκε γάρ κ.τ.λ.] 'Why, the state was doing us a wrong.'

C

ἔκρινε] Perhaps aorist, as referring to a single act, whereas the imperfect preceding may be taken as referring to a course of conduct.

αὐτῶν θαυμάζοιμεν λεγόντων] θαυμάζειν is often constructed in Plato with a gen. of the person and an acc. of the thing (e.g. Apol. 17 A; Phaedo 89 A; Theaet. 161 B; Prot. 329 C). In this passage we have the two halves of the construction separately, the gen. here and the acc. immediately below—μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα.

εἴωθας . . . ἀποκρίνεσθαι] The laws are supposed to turn the tables on Socrates by employing against him his own favourite dialectical method. On the importance assigned by Socrates to dialectic cp. Phil. 57 E; Prot. 329 B; Rep. 534 D.

φέρε γάρ] 'Come now' = 'age nunc.'

D

τί ἐγκαλῶν] The participle is equivalent to a causal clause—'What complaint have you that,' &c.

πρῶτον μὲν] See note on 53 B, πρῶτον μέν.

ἐλάβανε] 'Took and had to wife.' The imperfect denotes the permanence of the connexion. Purves.

τοῖς περὶ . . . παιδείαν] Aristotle complains that this department of legislation was neglected in Greek states, with the exception of Sparta and a few others (E. N. X. 9, § 13. Cp. Pol. VIII. 1, § 4). We must bear in mind however that νόμος means 'custom' as well as 'law.'

Παιδεία and τροφή constantly occur together, as in the passage before us and in 54 A. Between them they cover the whole field of education, being the correlatives of μουσική and γυμναστική. Cp. Phaedo 107 D, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Αἴδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς: Menex. 237 A, B, τὴν εὐγένειαν οὖν πρῶτον αὐτῶν ἐγκωμιάζωμεν, δεύτερον δὲ τροφὴν τε καὶ παιδείαν.

ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν] Cp. Rep. 376 E, τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; ἡ χαλεπὸν εὐρεῖν βελτίω τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου εὐρημένης; ἔστι δὲ που ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική. Afterwards (Ibid. 410 B and C) Plato goes on to declare that the common idea was erroneous, namely that γυμναστική was for the sake of the body and μουσική for the sake of the soul. For the true end of γυμναστική was not to increase the strength of the body, but to wake up the spirited element (τὸ θυμοειδές) in the soul.

μουσική was a wide term, including both the instruction in reading and writing, which was given by the γραμματιστής, the learning of the lyre, which was part of every Athenian boy's education, and the committal to memory of passages of poetry, whether adapted to the lyre or not (Prot. 312 B, 325 C-326 B; Theag. 122 E; Aristoph. Clouds 964, &c.; Ar. Pol. VIII. 3). In the Laws (809 E-810 A) Plato fixes the proper age for learning γράμματα at from 10 to 13, and for learning the lyre at from 13 to 16.

E πρῶτον μὲν] See note on 53 B, πρῶτον μὲν.

δοῦλος] Cp. Cicero Pro Clu. § 146, 'Legum denique idcirco omnes servi sumus, ut liberi esse possimus.'

καὶ σοὶ . . . δίκαιον] Wagner follows Stallbaum in reading καὶ σύ, 'as there is no other passage with the construction δίκαιόν μοι ἐστι τοῦτο ποιεῖν,' which seems a hazardous statement.

51 A ἀντιτύπτειν] Strepsiades in the Clouds (1424) proposes

θεῖναι νόμον τοῖς υἱέσιν, τοὺς πατέρας ἀντιτύπτειν,

on the ground that, as parents beat their children out of loving-kindness, the children were bound in their turn to show the same solicitude for them.

ἄρα] This sarcastic or emphatic use of ἄρα is commonly confined to the latter of two contrasted clauses, but here we have it with the former as well—ἡ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πατέρα κ.τ.λ. For this duplication of ἄρα cp. Prot. 325 B, C; Laws 931 C. Instances of the single ἄρα in emphasizing a contrast are common enough, e.g. Apol. 34 C; Phaedo 68 A; Phil. 30 B; Rep. 600 D.

ἐξέσται σοι] 'Are you to have license?'

καὶ σὺ δέ] The combination καὶ . . . δέ is an instance of the emphatic use of δέ, which enables that particle to appear sometimes, as here, in the apodosis of a sentence, whereas its ordinary use is as a conjunction coupling one sentence with another. Cp. Theaet. 171 E and the extraordinary use in Theages 121 A, καὶ εἰ ἀσχολία δὲ μὴ πάνυ τις μεγάλη, ὅμως κ.τ.λ.

ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν] 'That in doing this you are acting justly.' πράττειν is properly used of moral action, i.e. action directed to a reasonable end, whereas ποιεῖν may be used of a random act. Cp. Charm. 163 B, Εἰπέ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ ταῦτόν καλεῖς τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πράττειν; Οὐ μέντοι, ἔφη; and Arist. E. N. III. 1, § 14, "Ἐτερον δ' εἴοικε καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοίαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα ποιεῖν.

ὁ . . . ἐπιμελόμενος] 'If you care.'

οὕτως εἰ σοφός] 'Does your wisdom come to this?' Cp. Apol. 18 A, ὥς ἐστι τις Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνὴρ.

τιμιώτερόν ἐστιν ἢ πατρίς] So in the letter of Plato to Archytas (358 A) the claims of country are put before those of parents—ἀλλὰ

κακῆϊνο δέϊ σε ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, ὅτι ἕκαστος ἡμῶν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνον γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς γενέσεως ἡμῶν τὸ μέν τι ἡ πατρίς μερίζεται, τὸ δέ τι οἱ γεννήσαντες, τὸ δὲ οἱ λοιποὶ φίλοι: and Xenophon, in describing the distress of the Ten Thousand after the capture of their officers, says (Anab. III. 1, § 3), οὐ δυνάμενοι καθεύδειν ὑπὸ λύπης καὶ πύθου πατρίδων, γονέων, γυναικῶν, παίδων. Similarly Cicero in the De Officiis I. § 57 strongly asserts the priority of the claims of country—‘cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiares, sed omnis omnium caritates patria una complexa est.’

ἐν μείζονι μοίρᾳ] Cp. Hdt. II. 172, τὰ μὲν δὴ πρῶτα κατάνοντο τὸν Ἀμασιν Αἰγύπτιοι, καὶ ἐν οὐδεμιῇ μοίρῃ μεγάλην ἦγον.

καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ] Supply ὅτι from above and *τινα* as subject. **B** See note on 45 D, *φάσκοντα κ.τ.λ.*

θωπεύειν] ‘Conciliate.’ The word is generally used in a bad sense, as in Eur. Med. 368; Aristoph. Acharn. 658.

ἐάν τε . . . ἐάν τε . . . ἐάν τε] ‘Whether . . . or . . . or.’ Cp. Gorg. 508 D, ἂν τε τύπτειν βούληται . . . ἐάν τε χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐάν τε ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἐάν τε, τὸ ἔσχατον, ἀποκτείνει; also Meno 72 D. In Gorg. 480 D we have ἐάν μὲν . . . ἐὰν δὲ . . . ἐὰν δὲ . . . ἐὰν δὲ . . . ἐὰν δέ, in the sense of ‘if . . . if,’ &c.

ἐάν τε δεῖσθαι] Supply *προσάττη*.

ποιητέον] = δεῖ ποιεῖν.

οὐχὶ ὑπεικτέον κ.τ.λ.] Corresponding to the *γραφαὶ ἀστρατείας*, *δειλίας* and *λειποταξίου* (Laws 943 D), all of which involved ἀτιμία of person but not of property. See Andocides, De Mysteriis § 74.

ποιητέον . . . ἢ πείθειν] A repetition of ἢ πείθειν ἢ ποιεῖν above. **C** Notice that the infin. πείθειν is governed by the δεῖ latent in ποιητέον. Cp. Gorg. 492 D, τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φῆς οὐ κολαστέον . . . ἐῶντα δὲ . . . ἐτοιμάζειν: Laws 876 C; Xen. Mem. I. 5, § 5. The same principle serves to palliate the extraordinary bit of bad grammar which meets us in Gorg. 513 E, ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολιταῖς θεραπεύειν . . . ποιούντας. See note on 49 A, ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον.

ἢ πείθειν . . . πέφυκε] ‘Or convince them of what is naturally just.’

τῷ ἔξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι] Dative of the means.

D

ἐπειδὴν δοκιμασθῇ] Alluding to the *δοκιμασία τῶν ἐφήβων*, a process of scrutiny which every youth had to pass at Athens before being enrolled on the list of citizens. See Demosthenes p. 1318.

ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους] It was part of the education of the Greek youth to learn the laws of their country. See Prot. 326 C, D, ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἐκ διδασκάλων ἀπαλλαγῶσιν, ἡ πόλις αὐ τοὺς τε νόμους ἀναγκάζει μανθάνειν καὶ κατὰ τούτους ζῆν κατὰ παράδειγμα.

ὃ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς] 'If anyone does not like us.'

ἐξείναι] Governed by *προαγορεύομεν*, but at the same time explanatory of *τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι*, which renders the sentence involved.

λαβόντα] Supply *αὐτόν*. The dat. *λαβόντι* might have been used, but this change to the acc. with infin. is quite common. Cp. Euthyphro 5 A; Symp. 176 D.

ἀπαγορεύει] 'Forbids.' *προαγορεύει* above = 'proclaims.'

ἐάν τε . . . ἐάν τε] Cp. B above.

εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκοιμεν] 'In case he did not like us.'

μετοικεῖν] *εἰς ἀποικίαν ἵεναι* above refers to a change of abode to an Athenian colony; *μετοικεῖν* here to a change into another state altogether. A resident in a foreign state was called *μέτοικος*.

E ὅς δ' ἂν ὑμῶν παραμείνῃ] 'But if any of you has stayed.'

ὅτι τε . . . οὐ πείθεται] The force of the sentence falls on *γεννηταῖς οὖσιν*—'In that we whom he refuses to obey begat him.' *γεννηταί*, 'parents,' is to be distinguished from *γεννήται* = 'gentiles.' *Γεννῆται οἱ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους μετέχοντες καὶ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἔχοντες κοινὰ ἰέρα*. Schol. RS.

καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσας] The first was a debt of nature (*γεννηταῖς*), the second of gratitude (*τροφεύσι*), but the third is one of contract (*ὁμολογήσας*).

πείθεσθαι] Pres. infin. instead of the more usual future. But the covenant does not refer merely to the future, but to the present as well. Cp. 50 C, *ὡμολόγητο . . . ἐμμένειν* and 52 C, *ὡμολόγεις . . . πολιτεύεσθαι*.

52 A θάτερα] The preference for the plural in such expressions is very marked in Greek.

Immediately below we have *οὐδέτερα*, as also in 44 D above. Cp. Phil. 15 E, Prot. 314 E, *ἐπὶ θάτερα*: Lysis 218 E, *ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ οὐδέτερα*: Phil. 43 D, *ἕνα μὲν ἡδύν, τὸν δ' αὖ λυπηρόν, τὸν δ' ἕνα μηδέτερα*: *ibid.* 43 E. As an interrogative *πότερα* is often used for *πότερον*, e.g. Phil. 50 D, and in the sense of 'alteruter' the plural is preferred, as in Rep. 499 C, *τούτων δὲ πότερα γενέσθαι ἢ ἀμφοτέρα ὥς ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδένα φημὶ ἔχειν λόγον*. So also *ὁπότερ' ἂν ποιῇ*, 'whichever he may do,' Gorg. 469 A. In all these cases, it is to be observed, that the idea is singular, not plural (or rather dual) as in *ἀμφοτέρα*. Similarly where we speak of 'a beginning, a middle and an end,' the Greek (Phil. 31 A) is *μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος*. Cp. Phaedrus 264 C, *ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπουν, ἀλλὰ μέσα τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα*. The same tendency is observable in such phrases as *ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ, ἐπ' ἀριστερᾷ* (Euthyd. 297 C) and has full play in the form used for the superlative

adverb. Although the comparative adverb keeps to the singular, yet the plural is apt to be used in phrases with the comparative adjective, e.g. Phil. 40 C, *μεμιμημένοι μέντοι τὰς ἀληθείς ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα*. In Laws 643 A we have *τὰ ὑμέτερα* and *τὰ ἐμά* = 'you' and 'I.'

τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ] This was said before in the words *οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς*: but this emphatic kind of tautology is so marked a feature of Plato's style that Riddell in his Digest of Idioms has labelled it under the title of 'binary structure.' Cp. Prot. 316 D, where the sentence might have ended at *χρῆ εὐλαβεῖσθαι* without the addition of *τὸν ταῦτα πράττοντα*.

ἐνέξεσθαι] 'Will be liable to.' Cp. *ἔνοχος ἔσται τῇ κρίσει* in Matt. v. 21, 22.

ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα] See note on 43 C, *ἐν τοῖς βαρύνται*'.

ὁμολογηκώς τυγχάνω] This may be considered a periphrastic form of the perfect of *ὁμολογέω*. Cp. Phil. 51 E, *τυγχάνει γεγονός*: Meno 71 A, *τυγχάνω εἰδώς* = *οἶδα*.

ὅτι σοι κ.τ.λ.] Explanatory of *τούτων*.

B

ἐπεδήμεις] *ἐπιδημεῖν* is to live in one's own country, as opposed to *ἀποδημεῖν* (Meno 80 B), from which we have the noun *ἀποδημίαν* below. Socrates carried his disposition to stay at home so far, that he seldom went outside the walls of the city, alleging as his reason for this love of town, that places and trees had nothing to teach him, whereas the men in the city had. See Phaedrus 230 C, D. Diogenes Laertius however (II, § 23) records that Socrates, in addition to his campaigns, visited Samos as a youth in company with Archelaus, as also Delphi and the Isthmus. His authority for the first statement is Ion of Chios, a contemporary of Socrates, for the second Aristotle, and for the third Favorinus.

ἐπὶ θεωρίαν] I. e. to attend as a spectator at the public games of Greece—the Olympian, Nemean, Isthmian or Pythian.

[*ὅτι μὴ ἅπαξ εἰς Ἴσθμόν*] These words are written in the margin of some MSS. They are omitted altogether by Schanz. They may be a saving clause inserted by someone who was acquainted with the statement of Favorinus referred to above.

εἰ μὴ ποι στρατευσόμενος] Cp. Diog. Laert. II. § 22, *Ἀποδημίας δὲ οὐκ ἔδεξθη, καθάπερ οἱ πλείους, πλὴν εἰ μὴ στρατεῦσθαι ἔδει*. The campaigns of Socrates are enumerated in Apol. 28 E. He fought at Potidaea, where the Athenians were engaged in operations from 432 to the close of 430 B.C., at Delium in 424, and at Amphipolis in 422 B.C.

εἰδέναι] 'So as to know them.' The epexegetical, or explanatory

use of the infinitive. Cp. Phaedrus 242 B, *ῥηθῆναι*: Euthyd. 305 D, *δοκεῖν*: Gorg. 513 E, *θεραπεύειν*: Rep. 416 A, *κακουργεῖν*.

C *πολιτεύεσθαι*] 'To live as a citizen.' So below in D, *ξυνέθου πολιτεύεσθαι*, *ὁμολογηκέναι πολιτεύεσθαι*. See note on 51 E, *πιέεσθαι*.

τά τε ἄλλα καί] 'And in particular.' Cp. *ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ* (50 B).

ὥς ἀρεσκούσης σοι τῆς πόλεως] 'Which shows that you were pleased with the city.' *ἀρεσκούσης* is the past imperfect participle.

φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι] 'To assess the penalty at banishment.' In a case in which there was no penalty appointed by law (which was technically known as a *δική* or *ἀγὼν τίμητος*) it was incumbent on the accuser to assess the penalty. The accused, if convicted, was allowed to propose a counter-estimate (*ἀντιτίμῃσις*). Had Socrates condescended to assess the penalty at banishment, there is no doubt but that his life would have been spared. See his reasons for refusing to do so stated in Apol. 37 C, D.

ἐκαλλωπίζου ὥς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν] 'Made a brave show of not being put out.' The construction *καλλωπίζεσθαι ὥς* occurs also in Theaet. 195 D, where it is followed by a gen. abs.—*καλλωπιζόμενος ὥς τι εὐρηκόταν ἡμῶν καλόν*.

ὥς ἔφησθα] See Apol. 37 B, C. For the form *ἔφησθα* cp. *ῥήσθαι*, Euthyphro 15 D; *διήεισθα*, Tim. 26 C.

ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει] 'Ashamed to belie those words,' lit. 'ashamed before those words.'

διαφθεῖραι] Supply *ἡμᾶς*.

D *φαυλότατος*] Cp. Meno 97 E, *οὐ πολλῆς τινὸς ἀξίον ἐστι τιμῆς*, *ὥσπερ δραπέτην ἄνθρωπον*. No vice on the part of a slave could be more inconvenient to masters than a tendency to run away. Consequently none was more severely condemned by opinion.

Πρῶτον [μέν]] The preponderance of MS. authority seems to be in favour of the *μέν*. See note on 53 B, *πρῶτον μέν*.

ἄλλο τι ἤ] See note on 50 A, *ἄλλο τι ἤ*.

E *ἀλλ' ἐν ἑτεσιν ἑβδομήκοντα*] 'But having had seventy years to do it in.' Cp. Apol. 17 D, *νὺν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγονῶς ἑβδομήκοντα*.

οὔτε Λακεδαίμονα . . . οὔτε Κρήτην] The dialogue of the Laws purports to have taken place in Crete between Megillus the Lacedaemonian, Cleinias the Cretan, and a stranger from Athens, who is generally identified with Plato himself. Socrates and his followers had an admiration for the institutions of Sparta and Crete, owing to the moral purpose discernible in them. Cp. Arist. E. N. I. 13, §§ 2, 3, *βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ*

τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους. Παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων ἔχομεν τοὺς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτας, καὶ εἴ τινες ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι γεγέννηται: also *ibid.* X. 9, § 13; Rep. 544 C; Prot. 342 B; Xen. Mem. IV. 4, § 15.

Ἑλληνίδων] This form is used of Greek women in Eur. El. 53 A 1076.

ἐλάττω . . . ἀπεδήμησας] Cogn. acc., as in 46 C, πλείω . . . μορμολύττηται.

δῆλον ὅτι] 'Of course.' For the position cp. Laws 648 B, φαίη που πᾶς ἂν δῆλον ὅτι and Arist. E. N. I. 13, § 5, Περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης δῆλον ὅτι.

τίνι . . . ἀνευ νόμων] 'For who could be pleased with a state apart from laws?' The state (πόλις) is essentially the constitution (πολιτεία), and the laws are the expression of the constitution.

ἐὰν ἡμῖν γε πείθῃ] Supply ἐμμενεῖς.

καταγέλαστος . . . ἐξελθὼν] Cp. Apol. 37 D, καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη ἐξελθόντι τηλικῶδε ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλιν πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζῆν.

ταῦτα παραβάς] Cogn. acc. 'If you transgress thus, and commit any of these errors.'

πρῶτον μὲν] Here we may say that the virtual antithesis to **B** πρῶτον μὲν comes in below in D at the words—'Ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἧξεις δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν, where τούτων τῶν τόπων refers to the same thing as τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πόλεων here. But πρῶτον μὲν constantly defeats the expectation which it raises of a definitely marked antithesis with δέ. We have had it five times previously in this dialogue (46 C, 48 A, 50 D, 50 E, 52 D), and in no case has it been followed by δέ. In 48 A we may say that it is answered by καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκοπεῖ in B, though that refers back immediately to οὗτός τε κ.τ.λ. above, and in 50 D by 'Ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ κ.τ.λ.: in the remaining cases there is nothing to correspond to it. We may explain this use of the isolated μὲν by saying that μὲν is a weaker form of μὴν and does not necessarily require anything to balance it. Or perhaps the fact is rather that πρῶτον so essentially suggests a contrast that it naturally takes μὲν, whether the contrast is carried out or not. How often is our 'to begin with' not followed up by any 'in the next place'! When πρῶτον μὲν is answered at all, it is generally by ἔπειτα or εἴτα, very seldom by ἔπειτα δέ (Xen. Anab. III. 2, § 10) or δεύτερον δέ. We have πρῶτον μὲν . . . ἔπειτα . . . ἔπειτα in Meno 90 A; πρῶτον μὲν . . . ἔπειτα in Phaedo 89 A, Charm. 167 B, Rep. 510 A, Tim. 69 D; πρῶτον μὲν . . . εἴτα in Laws 640 E, 649 D; πρῶτον μὲν . . . τί δέ in Laws 649 B. τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ] τούτων refers to Θηβαῖοι and Μεγαρεῖς

implied in *Θήβαζε* and *Μέγαράδε*—an instance of construction according to the sense.*

ὑποβλέψονταί σε] ‘Will look upon you with suspicion.’

βεβαιώσεις . . . τὴν δόξαν] ‘You will be establishing the reputation of the jurors.’ Similarly in the *Apology* (35 D) Socrates is made to argue that if he tried to persuade the judges to vote against their oath and consciences, he would be justifying Meletus in his charge of impiety.

C *ὥστε δοκεῖν*] In *Euthyd.* 305 D the infinitive is used epexegetically without *δοκεῖν*—*ἐὰν τούτους εἰς δόξαν καταστήσωσι μηδενὸς δοκεῖν ἀξίους εἶναι*.

ἄρα ἀξίόν σοι ζῆν ἔσται;] ‘Will life be worth your living?’ Cp. *Phaedo* 65 A; *Arist. E. N.* IV. 3, § 23, *ἀφειδῆς τοῦ βίου, ὥς οὐκ ἀξιον ὃν πάντως ζῆν*.

ἢ πλησιάσεις τούτοις κ.τ.λ.] ‘Or will you consort with them and have the effrontery to discourse—but what will you say, Socrates?—the same words as here?’

ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος] *ἀπαναισχυντεῖν* is similarly constructed with a participle in *Apol.* 31 B, *τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἰοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντήσαι παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα κ.τ.λ.*

ἀξιον] *ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη* are taken as constituting one idea. The employment of a neuter adjective with a substantive not of the neuter gender is quite common in Greek when an abstract turn is to be given to a sentence. Cp. *Rep.* 455 E, *ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ ἀσθενέστερον γυνὴ ἀνδρός*.

D *τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα*] Cp. *Apol.* 20 C, *τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πρᾶγμα*; *Hip. Maj.* 286 E, *φαῦλον γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐμὸν πρᾶγμα καὶ ιδιωτικόν*, where the context shows that *πρᾶγμα* is not ‘conduct,’ as we might be tempted to render it here, but ‘case.’

οἷεσθαί γε χρή] ‘You must think so.’ This phrase is frequent in Plato. Cp. 54 B; *Phaedo* 68 B; *Charm.* 163 B; *Prot.* 325 C, *Gorg.* 522 A.

τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος] See note on 45 C, *εἰσὶν ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖ ξένοι*.

πλείστη ἀταξία] On the reputation of Thessaly for unruliness cp. *Xen. Mem.* I. 2, § 24, *Κριτίας μὲν φygῶν εἰς Θετταλίαν, ἐκεῖ συνῆν ἀνθρώποις ἀνομίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ δικαιοσύνῃ χρωμένους*.

σκευὴν τε] The *τε* looks on to *καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας*.

διφθέραν λαβών] The dress of Athenian rustics. Cp. *Aristoph. Clouds* 72—

ὥσπερ ὁ πατήρ σου διφθέραν ἐνημμένος,
on which the Scholiast remarks *ποιμενικὸν περιβόλαιον*.

ἐτόλμησας] 'You could condescend to.'

E

οὕτω γλίσχωρως ἐπιθυμείν ζῆν] 'Such an avaricious desire for life.' γλίσχωρως is used of a 'tight-fingered' or 'close-fisted' man. It is derived from γλίχσθαι, 'to cling to.' Cp. Phaedo 117 A, γλιχόμενος τοῦ ζῆν.

παραβάς] 'As to transgress.'

πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ] Eur. Alc. 705—

ἀκούσει πολλὰ κοῦ ψευδῆ κακά.

ὑπερχόμενος] 'Truckling to,' 'fawning on.' Cp. Rep. 426 C, ὑποτρέχων: Laws 923 B, θωπείαις ὑποδραμών: Rep. 336 C, ὑποκατακλινόμενος: 494 C, ὑποκείσονται.

τί ποιῶν ἤ] τί has here the force of τί ἄλλο.

εὐωχούμενος ἐν Θετταλίᾳ] The Thessalians were famous for their good living. Athenaeus (p. 137) says εὐτράπεζοι δ' εἰσὶν ὄντως οἱ Θετταλοί. Cp. p. 418 and 527, where Theopompus is quoted as saying of the Thessalians, καὶ μᾶλλον σπονδάζουσιν ὅπως ὄψων πανταδαπῶν τὰς τραπέζας παραθήσονται πλήρεις ἢ τὸν αὐτῶν βίον ὅπως παρασχέσονται κεκοσμημένον.

ἡμῖν] Ethic dative. 'Pray, what will become of them?'

54 A

Ἀλλὰ δὴ] 'But you will say,' anticipating an objection. Cp. Apol. 37 C, ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσωμαι: Rep. 365 D, ἀλλὰ δὴ θεοὺς οὔτε λανθάνειν οὔτε βιάσασθαι δυνατόν. See note on 48 A, ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ.

τῶν παίδων ἕνεκα] Socrates had three sons, one a stripling (μειράκιον) and two children. See Apol. 34 D, ὥστε καὶ οἰκεῖοί μοι εἰσι καὶ υἱεῖς, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἷς μὲν μειράκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία: Phaedo 116 B, δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ υἱεῖς σμικροὶ ἦσαν, εἷς δὲ μέγας. The name of the eldest was Lamprocles (Xen. Mem. II. 2, § 1). The two younger were Sophroniscus and Menexenus (Diog. Laert. II. § 26).

καὶ τοῦτο] There is no force in 'also' here, so that we may take the καὶ as merely emphasizing the τοῦτο—'that *this* may be the benefit they may reap from you.'

θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύονται] The future middle is never quite equivalent to the future passive. Here the statement is made from the point of view of the children's interest.

B

οἰεσθαι γε χρή] See note on 53 D, οἰεσθαι γε χρή.

παῖδας] The article is omitted because the word is used indefinitely, 'children.'

ἄμεινον] The comparative is usual with this word (as in Apol. 19 A, εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί) and δικαιότερον and ὁσιώτερον are accommodated to it by a species of attraction. Stallbaum.

C οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοί] So in the *Phaedo* (63 B) Socrates speaks of going after death *παρὰ θεοῦς ἄλλους σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς. τὸ σὸν μέρος*] ‘As far as in you lay.’ Cp. 45 D, 50 B.

D οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες] The word is desiderative in form—‘those who are seized with Corybantic frenzy.’ The Corybantes were priests of Cybele, whose rites were attended with wild music and dancing. Cp. *Ion* 534 A, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες οὐκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες ὀρχοῦνται: *Symp.* 215 E, ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούω, πολὺ μοι μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν κορυβαντιῶντων ἢ τε καρδία πηδᾷ καὶ δάκρυα ἐκχεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων τῶν τούτου.

βομβεῖ] ‘Keeps humming.’

μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν] As mesmeric patients can be made insensible to all but one idea, so the Corybantes had ears only for the music of their own deity. Cp. *Ion* 536 C, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες ἐκείνου μόνου αἰσθάνονται τοῦ μέλους ὁξέως, ὃ ἂν ᾗ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξ ὅτου ἂν κατέχωνται.

E ἐπειδὴ ταύτη ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται] Cp. the end of the *Apology*, ἀδελον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ. In both cases the reference is perhaps to Apollo, under whose special patronage Socrates conceived himself to be (see *Phaedo* 85 B): but the curious vacillation in Plato’s mind between polytheistic and monotheistic notions always leaves an element of doubt in such expressions, and modern sentiment would incline us to render ὁ θεός simply ‘God,’ as in *Apol.* 29 D, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν. We had a similar expression of pious trust in divine guidance in 43 D, εἰ ταύτη τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτη ἔστω, with which we may compare *Apol.* 19 A, ὅμως δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅππῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον. Instances of piety of expression abound in Plato, e. g. *Phaedrus* 69 D, εἰ ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ: *ibid.* 80 D, *Laws* 632 E, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ: *Phaedrus* 246 C, ὅππῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον: and the use of such language is inculcated in the *First Alcibiades*—

ΑΛ. Ἐὰν βούλῃ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδης.

ΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ πῶς χρὴ λέγειν;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι εἰ ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ.

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